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Supreme Court Opinions: October 2004 Term
Summary
This report contains synopses of Supreme Court decisions issued from the
beginning of the October 2004 Term through the end of the Term on June 27, 2005.
Included in this listing are all cases decided by signed opinion and selected cases
decided per curiam.  In addition to the summary, the date of decision is indicated,
and cites to United States Law Week and West’s Supreme Court Reporter are
provided.  Following each synopsis the vote on the Court’s holding is indicated in
bold typeface, and authors of the Court’s opinion and of any concurring and
dissenting opinions, along with the Justices who joined those opinions, are identified.
Cases are listed alphabetically, and a subject index is appended.  These synopses are
prepared throughout the Term and can be accessed through the CRS Home Page
([http://www.crs.gov/reference/general/law/04_term.shtml]), which also provides
links from the synopses to the full texts of the Court’s opinions.
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Alaska v. United States   125 S. Ct. 2137, 73 USLW 4441   (6-6-05)
Submerged lands, Alaska Statehood Act: A special master correctly
determined that the United States owns two disputed areas of submerged lands
in southeast Alaska.  Waters of the Alexander Archipelago do not qualify as
“inland waters,” and hence lands underlying those waters are not “submerged
lands” that could have passed to Alaska at statehood.  Alaska’s claim that these
waters are “historic” inland waters over which the United States has denied the
ships of other nations the right of “innocent passage” is rejected.  At best,
Alaska’s submissions establish that over the years the United States made one
official statement consistent with such an assertion and seized one foreign
vessel, but “[t]hese incidents are insufficient to demonstrate the continuous
assertion of exclusive authority . . . necessary to support an historic inland
waters claim.”  Juridical bays constitute inland waters, but the Archipelago
cannot be divided into two distinct juridical bays.  Glacier Bay, on the other
hand, “is a textbook example of a juridical bay.”  The United States can rebut
the presumption that lands underlying inland waters passed to the state at
statehood by establishing that it set aside the lands prior to statehood and
demonstrated a clear intent to retain title.  The United States created Glacier Bay
National Monument prior to statehood, and included in the Monument the
submerged lands under the Bay.  Congress expressed an intent to retain title to
the entire Monument in section 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act.  That
provision conveyed to Alaska “all real and personal property” used for fish and
wildlife protection under three specified laws, and provided that “such transfer
shall not include lands withdrawn or otherwise set apart as refuges or
reservations for the protection of wildlife.”  The Antiquities Act, the authority
under which the Monument was created, was not one of the three specified
laws, but the proviso “is best read . . . as expressing an independent and general
rule uncoupled from the initial clause.”
9-0 (Alexander Archipelago); 6-3 (Glacier Bay).  Opinion of Court by Kennedy,
unanimous in part, and joined in separate part by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by
Scalia, joined by Rehnquist and Thomas.
American Trucking Ass’ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n   125 S. Ct. 2419, 73
USLW 4532   (6-20-05)
Commerce Clause, state hauling fee:  Michigan’s flat $100 annual fee
imposed on trucks engaged in  intrastate hauling does not discriminate against
interstate commerce in violation of the “dormant” Commerce Clause.  The fee
“applies evenhandedly to all carriers that make domestic journeys,” and does
not tax activity that takes place outside the state.  There is no precedent for
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holding such “a neutral, locally focused fee” to be inconsistent with the dormant
Commerce Clause.  Nothing in the record indicates that the fee imposes “any
significant practical burden on interstate trade.”  Levying the fee on a per-truck
rather than per-mile basis is fairly related to the services provided, given the
objectives of defraying costs of administering size and weight, insurance, and
safety requirements.  The 1987 Scheiner case, invalidating a flat fee a state
imposed on all trucks using its roads, is distinguished; Michigan’s fee on in-
state hauling “does not tax an interstate truck’s entry into the State nor does it
tax transactions spanning multiple States.”  The “internal consistency” test,
which requires consideration of what would happen if all states imposed a
similar tax,  is not offended.  Any such cumulative fees would be imposed only
because a carrier engages in local business in multiple states, not because the
carrier engages in interstate commerce in multiple states.
9-0.  Opinion of Court by Breyer, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.  Concurring opinions by Scalia and by Thomas.
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States   125 S. Ct. 2129, 73 USLW 4393   (5-31-05)
Statutory interpretation, knowingly corrupt persuasion:  Jury instructions
failed to convey the requisite consciousness of wrongdoing embodied in a
provision making it a crime to “knowingly  use[ ] intimidation or physical force,
threaten[ ], or corruptly persuade[ ]” another person to withhold or destroy
documents for use in an official proceeding.  The restraint that is “traditionally
exercised” in determining the scope of a federal criminal statute “is particularly
appropriate . . . where the act underlying the conviction — ‘persuas[ion]’ — is
by itself innocent.”  The most “natural” reading of the statute is that
“knowingly” modifies “corruptly persuades” as well as the other listed actions.
This most natural grammatical reading is to be preferred even though the
statutory formulation is “inelegant.”  Only persons conscious of wrongdoing can
be said to “knowingly corruptly persuade.”  The jury was instructed, however,
that it could convict if it found that the petitioner intended to “subvert,
undermine, or impede” government factfinding, and that the petitioner could be
found guilty even if it “honestly and sincerely believed that its conduct was
lawful.”  By excluding the requirement of “dishonest” action, and by adding the
term “impede” to the phrase “subvert or undermine” contained in the Pattern
Jury Instruction, the district court’s instruction swept in innocent persuasion,
and departed from the statute’s requirement that punishable persuasion be
“knowingly . . . corrupt.”  The instruction also failed to require a nexus between
the persuasion to shred documents and any particular proceeding.  A proceeding
need not be pending when the persuasion takes place, “but it is quite another
[thing] to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen.”  The jury charge was an
inadequate basis, therefore, for finding that the petitioner accounting company
violated the law when it directed employees to destroy files, pursuant to its
“document retention policy,” relating to its audits of Enron Corporation.
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Rehnquist.
Ballard v. Commissioner   125 S.  Ct.  1270, 73 USLW 4194   (3-7-05)
Tax Court, report of special trial judges:  The Tax Court may not exclude
from the record on appeal reports submitted by special trial judges under Tax
Court Rule 183.  The rule provides that the Tax Court judge to whom a case is
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assigned after submission of a special trial judge’s report may adopt that report,
may modify or reject it in whole or in part, or may seek further evidence or
briefs.  The rule further provides that the special trial judge’s findings of fact
“shall be presumed to be correct,” and that “due regard” must be given to the
fact the special trial judge had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of
witnesses.  Changes to the rules adopted in 1983 eliminated a requirement that
parties be served with a copy of the special trial judge’s report and be allowed
to file exceptions for consideration by the Tax Court judge, but did not change
the requirement that “due regard” be paid to the special trial judge’s findings of
fact.  The Tax Court implemented these changes by treating the special trial
judge’s report “essentially as an in-house draft to be worked over
collaboratively by the [Tax Court] judge and the special trial judge.”  At the
conclusion of this collaboration the Tax Court judge issues a decision in all
cases “agree[ing] with and adopt[ing]” the opinion of the special trial judge.
The extent to which the final, collaborative opinion departs from the original
report of the special trial judge is not disclosed.  “The Tax Court, like all other
decisionmaking tribunals, is obliged to follow its own Rules,” which do not
authorize such procedures.  “The Tax Court’s practice of not disclosing the
special trial judge’s original report, and of obscuring the Tax Court judge’s
mode of reviewing that report, impeded fully informed appellate review of the
Tax Court’s decision.”  Concealment of the special trial judge’s report runs
counter to the “generally prevailing practice” under which reports of hearing
officers, magistrates, and the like are made part of the record on appeal.  An
analogy to the practice of omitting a single Tax Court judge’s opinion from the
record when full court review occurs is misplaced; that procedure is authorized
by statute, and full Tax Court review is designed for resolution of legal issues,
not factual issues.
7-2.  Opinion of Court by Ginsburg, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Kennedy, joined by Scalia.
Dissenting opinion by Rehnquist, joined by Thomas.
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC   125 S. Ct. 1788, 73 USLW 4311   (4-27-05)
Preemption, FIFRA, common law actions: The Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) does not preempt all state common
law suits for damages resulting from pesticide application.  FIFRA prohibits
States from imposing “any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition
to or different from [federal requirements].”  Although “the term ‘requirements’
. . . reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and regulations, to
embrace common-law duties,” the provision sets two limits on the scope of
preemption.  The requirement must be “for labeling or packaging,” and must be
“in addition to or different from” federal labeling and packaging requirements.
There are many common law claims, e.g., those for defective design, defective
manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty, that do not
impose labeling or packaging requirements.  The fact that a finding of liability
on any of these claims might induce a manufacturer to change its label does not
turn it into a labeling requirement.  “A requirement is a rule of law that must be
obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that motivates an optional decision is
not a requirement.”  The petitioners’ fraud and negligent-failure-to-warn claims
are premised on common law rules that qualify as “requirements for labeling
and packaging.”  The case is remanded, however, for consideration of whether
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these claims are “in addition to or different from” FIFRA’s misbranding
standards, or whether they merely provide a remedy for violation of the federal
standards.  The state requirements for which the damage remedy is provided
need not be identical to the federal requirements; it suffices if they are
“genuinely equivalent.”  The presumption against preemption in areas of
traditional state regulation strengthens the interpretation allowing states to
provide additional remedies.  “If Congress had intended to [eliminate] a long
available form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more
clearly.”  FIFRA does not impose uniform regulation, but rather “authorizes a
relatively decentralized scheme”; “[p]rivate remedies that enforce federal
misbranding requirements would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning
of FIFRA.”
9-0 (design, manufacture, testing, fraud, and negligence claims); 7-2 (breach of
warranty claims).  Opinion of Court by Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Concurring and dissenting opinion by
Thomas, joined by Scalia.
Bell v. Cone   125 S.  Ct.  847, 73 USLW 3432   (1-24-05)
Habeas corpus, deference to state courts: The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that
the Tennessee Supreme Court failed to cure the constitutional deficiency in a
statutory “aggravating circumstance” justifying imposition of the death penalty
failed to comport with the deference required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  The
Sixth Circuit based its decision overturning the respondent’s death penalty on
the State’s reliance on the unconstitutionally vague “especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel” aggravating circumstance, which is unconstitutional without
a narrowing construction.  Although the Tennessee Supreme Court did not
mention a narrowing construction, it is clear that it applied one.  Because the
state court had previously construed the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”
circumstance narrowly “and had followed that precedent numerous times, we
must presume that it did the same thing here.”  Even without the presumption,
however, it is clear that the court applied the narrower construction.  The facts
on which the court relied to describe the brutal beating murder of an elderly
couple were sufficient to satisfy “the torture prong” of the narrowed
construction, which requires evidence that the defendant inflicted torture on the
victim before his death.  The narrowing construction itself was not
unconstitutionally vague.
9-0.  Per curiam.  Concurring opinion by Ginsburg, joined by Souter and Breyer.
Bell v. Thompson   125 S. Ct. 2825, 73 USLW 4624   (6-27-05)
Appeals, habeas corpus: The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals abused its
discretion in a state prisoner’s habeas corpus case by staying its mandate and
issuing an amended opinion six months after the Supreme Court denied
certiorari and five months after it denied a rehearing.  “The consequence of
delay for the State’s criminal justice system was compounded by the [appeals
court’s] failure to . . . give notice to the parties that [it] was reconsidering its
earlier opinion.”  This holding assumes arguendo that Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 41 authorizes a stay of a mandate following denial of certiorari.  The
Sixth Circuit acted on the basis of a psychologist’s report, negligently omitted
from the original appeal in the federal habeas case, finding that the petitioner
had been suffering from “severe mental illness” at the time of his capital
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offense.  Even if that psychologist’s report had been included in the initial
record reviewed by the appeals court, however, the respondent “would have
faced an uphill battle” in obtaining federal habeas relief based on
constitutionally inadequate representation by counsel.  The psychologist’s report
had been prepared 13 years after the crime, and was contradicted by evaluations
of two court-appointed experts. This evidence “would not come close to
satisfying the miscarriage of justice standard” that would have applied had the
appeals court recalled its mandate, and it did not justify the court’s decision to
withhold the mandate without notice to the parties.  “Federalism concerns”
relating to “finality and comity” are also implicated.  The state “expended
considerable time and resources” in scheduling and preparing for the
respondent’s execution, and the Sixth Circuit “did not accord the appropriate
level of respect” to the state’s judgment that the respondent’s crimes merited
“the ultimate punishment.”
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas.  Dissenting opinion by Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
Bradshaw v. Stumpf   125 S. Ct. 2398, 73 USLW 4463   (6-13-05)
Due Process, guilty plea, defendant’s awareness of charges: There is no
requirement that the judge himself must inform the defendant of the elements
of each charge before accepting a guilty plea.  Rather, the constitutional
prerequisites for a valid guilty plea — that it be done voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently — can be met if the record shows that “the nature of the charge
and the elements of the offense were explained to the defendant by his own,
competent counsel.”  In this case the defendant’s guilty plea to aggravated
murder is not inconsistent with his claim that it was his accomplice and not he
who shot the victim, since Ohio law provides that aiders and abettors may be
convicted of the offense.  The defendant could have had the requisite intent to
kill without having fired the gun that killed the victim.  Nor is the guilty plea
inconsistent with the defendant’s desire to introduce evidence as to his role in
the murder, since the judge had explained that the defense would have the
opportunity to introduce mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of his trial.
The fact that the plea may, in retrospect, have been a poor bargain for the
defendant is not a basis for invalidation.  The prosecution’s inconsistent
identification of the triggerman in its case against the defendant and its case
against his accomplice is not a basis for invalidating the defendant’s guilty plea,
but may have a bearing on the validity of the death sentence.  The case is
remanded for consideration of this sentencing issue.
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by O’Connor.  Concurring opinions by
Souter, joined by Ginsburg; and by Thomas, joined by Scalia.
Brosseau v. Haugen   125 S. Ct. 596, 73 USLW 3350   (12-13-04)
Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity of police officer: A police officer
sued for using excessive force in seizing a suspect is entitled to qualified
immunity if her understanding of the law governing seizure of the suspect, even
though erroneous, was “reasonable” under the circumstances she confronted.
An officer’s misunderstanding of the law is reasonable if the law at the time did
not “clearly establish” that the officer’s conduct would violate the Constitution.
Cases dealing with the shooting of a suspect who is fleeing in a car and who
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presents a risk to others are very fact-specific, and create “a hazy border
between excessive and acceptable force.”  The officer’s conduct in this case —
shooting a suspect who was attempting to flee in a vehicle after having ignored
the officer’s order to get out of the vehicle, and after the officer had used force
in an effort to prevent him from starting the vehicle — was not clearly violative
of the Fourth Amendment.
8-1.  Per curiam.  Concurring opinion by Breyer, joined by Scalia and Ginsburg.
Dissenting opinion by Stevens.
Brown v. Payton   125 S. Ct. 1432, 73 USLW 4223 (3-22-05)
Habeas corpus, deference to state courts: The California Supreme Court’s
decision that there was no reasonable likelihood that a capital sentencing jury
believed that it was required to ignore mitigating evidence was not “contrary
to,” or an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law, the
standard set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act for limiting
federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners.  The Ninth Circuit, therefore,
should not have granted habeas relief in this case.  During the sentencing phase
of his trial the defendant had introduced evidence of his post-crime religious
conversion and work with a prison ministry.  The jury instruction at issue,
“factor (k),” directed the jury to consider “any other circumstance which
extenuates the gravity of the crime.”  The prosecutor erroneously told jurors that
factor (k) limited them to consideration of conduct that pre-dated the crime, and
did not allow consideration of the defendant’s evidence of post-crime
conversion.  The trial judge, despite the defense counsel’s request, did not
correct this erroneous assertion.  The jury recommended death and the trial
judge imposed that sentence.  The California Supreme Court, upholding the
sentence, relied on its reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Boyde
v. California (1990), which held that factor (k) does not limit the jury’s
consideration to circumstances of the crime, but rather allows consideration of
a defendant’s background and character.  In light of Boyde, the California court
did not act unreasonably in declining to distinguish between pre-crime and post-
crime mitigating evidence.  Considering “the whole context of the trial,” as
required by Boyde, it was not unreasonable for the court to conclude that the
jurors did not likely believe they were required to disregard the defendant’s
mitigating evidence.  The defendant presented two days of testimony about his
post-crime conversion, the prosecutor devoted substantial attention to
discounting its importance, and the court did not instruct the jurors to disregard
the evidence.
5-3.  Opinion of Court by Kennedy, joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinions by Scalia, joined by Thomas; and by Breyer.
Dissenting opinion by Souter, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg.  Rehnquist did
not participate.
Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt   125 S.  Ct.  1172, 73 USLW 4177   (3-1-05)
Government contracts: The Federal Government is legally bound to pay
“contract support costs” incurred by two Indian tribes pursuant to a contract by
which the tribes agreed to supply health services and other services normally
provided by the Government, in exchange for the Government’s reimbursement
of the tribes’costs and administrative expenses.  The contracts were authorized
by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (Act), which
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specifies that “contract support costs” are a component of reimbursable
administrative expenses.  The Government did not deny its promise to pay these
costs, or its failure to do so.  Rather, the Government argued that its debts were
not legally binding because Congress had failed to appropriate sufficient funds
for paying the obligation.  In each year at issue, however, Congress had enacted
a lump-sum appropriation “to carry out” the act, and the amount of the
appropriation was “far more” than the amounts at issue.  The appropriations,
being lump sum, “contained no relevant statutory restriction” on payment of the
debts.  A proviso stating that funding is “subject to the availability of
appropriations” does not vest the Secretary with authority to disregard
contractual obligations in favor of other spending.  The act does not create a
special contract that immunizes the Government from liability; a provision that
a special services contract shall not be construed to be a procurement contract
seems designed to avoid “technical burdens that often accompany procurement,
not to weaken a contract’s binding nature.”  Nor is the Government saved by a
proviso that the Secretary need not reduce funds available to one tribe in order
to provide for another tribe.  The appropriations contained other unrestricted
funds sufficient to pay the claims at issue, and the Government may not avoid
a debt by obligating unrestricted funds for another purpose.  A later-enacted
statute restricting use of funds for contract support costs is open to the
interpretation that it bars payment on claims arising under the reimbursement
contracts, but that interpretation is rejected because of its questionable
constitutionality.
8-0.  Opinion of Court by Breyer, joined by all Justices except Rehnquist, who
did not participate.
City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams   125 S. Ct. 1453, 73 USLW 4217   (3-22-05)
Telecommunications Act of 1996; 42 USC § 1983: An individual may not use
42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce limitations on local zoning authority imposed by
the Communications Act of 1934 (Act), as amended by the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (TCA).  Section 332(c)(7) of the act, which creates a cause of
action against state and local governments that fail to comply, is the exclusive
remedy. Although section 1983 authorizes suits to enforce individual rights
created by federal statutes, not all statutory rights are enforceable under section
1983.  The issue is one of congressional intent.  Provision of an express private
right of action in a statute “is ordinarily an indication that Congress did not
intend to leave open a more expansive remedy under § 1983.”  There is no
indication that Congress intended the TCA remedy to complement rather than
supplant § 1983.  Section 332(c)(7) “limits relief in ways that § 1983 does not”:
judicial review under § 332(c)(7) must be sought within 30 days of final zoning
action, it is unclear whether relief may include damages, and there is no
provision for recovery of attorney’s fees.  The TCA’s “saving clause,” providing
that TCA amendments shall not be construed to  “impair” existing federal law,
does not reflect congressional intent to allow §1983 actions.  Section 332(c)(7)
does not “impair” the operation of § 1983, but rather “has no effect on § 1983
whatsoever.”  The rights created by 332(c)(7) did not exist before the passage
of the TCA, and the claims enforceable under § 1983 prior to enactment of the
TCA continue to be available after its enactment.
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9-0.  Opinion of Court by Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Breyer, joined
by O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg.  Concurring opinion by Stevens.
City of San Diego v. Roe   125 S. Ct. 521, 73 USLW 3334   (12-6-04)
Public employment, freedom of expression: A police department that fired an
officer for refusing to stop selling sexually explicit videos on the Internet
auction site eBay did not violate the officer’s First Amendment right to freedom
of speech.  One video showed the officer stripping off a police uniform and
masturbating; the officer also offered to sell official uniforms of his department,
and identified himself on his user profile as employed in law enforcement.  The
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
(1995) (NTEU) is misplaced.  The Court in NTEU protected public employees’
speech that was unrelated to employment and that had no effect on the mission
and purpose of the employer.  Here the respondent “took deliberate steps to link
his videos and other wares to his police work, all in a way injurious to his
employer.”  The case is governed instead by Pickering v. Board of Education
(1968), which adopted a balancing test for speech of public employees upon
“matters of public concern.”  But because the respondent’s expression “does not
qualify as a matter of public concern under any view of the public concern test,”
Pickering balancing “does not come into play.”  The respondent’s expression
“did nothing to inform the public about any aspect of [the police department’s]
functioning or operation,” was “designed to exploit his employer’s image,” and
“was detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer.”
9-0.  Per curiam.
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y.   125 S. Ct. 1478, 73 USLW 4242   (3-
29-05)
Native Americans, reservation land, state taxation:  Land originally held by
the Oneida Nation as part of its reservation but sold to non-Indians in 1807 and
not repurchased by the Nation until 1997 is not immune from taxation by the
State of New York.  The parcels of land at issue are now within the city of
Sherrill, and the Oneida Nation uses them to operate a gas station, a
convenience store, and a textile facility.  Although the Nation “acquired the land
in the open market and does not seek to uproot current property owners,”
recognition of sovereign control would have some of the same “disruptive
practical consequences” that dispossession would have.  A “checkerboard of
alternating state and tribal jurisdiction . . . would seriously burden the
administration of state and local governments.”  A statute authorizing the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire land in trust for Indians after considering the
impact on state and local tax rolls “provides the proper avenue for [the Nation]
to reestablish sovereign authority” over territory once held.  “[T]he distance
from 1805 to the present day, the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking equitable relief
against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill
spanning several generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and
impossibility, and render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit
seeks unilaterally to initiate.”
8-1.  Opinion of Court by Ginsburg, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Souter.
Dissenting opinion by Stevens.
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Clark v. Martinez   125 S. Ct. 716, 73 USLW 4100   (1-12-05)
Immigration, detention of alien pending removal: The authority granted to
the Secretary of Homeland Security by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to detain a
removable alien beyond the removal period applies to inadmissible aliens in the
same manner that the Court held it to apply to admitted aliens in Zadvydas v.
Davis (2001).  The provision permits detention for a period “reasonably
necessary” to effectuate removal, but does not permit detention once removal
is no longer reasonably foreseeable.  The Zadvydas Court prescribed a six-
month presumptive detention period for aliens already admitted, and that period
applies to inadmissible aliens as well.  By its terms, the language of §
1231(a)(6) applies to “an alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under
section 1182.”  The provision’s operative language “applies without
differentiation to all three categories of aliens that are its subject,” and to give
the words a different meaning for each category “would be to invent a statute
rather than interpret one.”  Although there may be different concerns present in
the case of inadmissible aliens, there is no basis for interpreting the same
language differently.  “It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous
language a limiting construction called for by one of [its] applications”; in such
instances “the lowest common denominator, as it were, must govern.”  Reliance
on the constitutional doubt canon, as the Court did in Zadvydas, is not designed
to allow litigants to invoke the constitutional rights of others or to allow courts
to apply statutes until they approach constitutional limits.  Rather, the canon is
a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory
text.
7-2.  Opinion of Court by Scalia, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by O’Connor.  Dissenting opinion by
Thomas, joined in part by Rehnquist.
Clingman v. Beaver   125 S. Ct. 2029, 73 USLW 4359   (5-23-05)
First Amendment, elections, semi-closed primary:  Oklahoma’s semi-closed
primary system, under which a political party may allow only its own members
and voters registered as Independents, but not those voters registered with other
political parties, to vote in its party primary election, does not violate the First
Amendment.  The Libertarian Party’s challenge to the Oklahoma law is rejected.
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut (1986), applying strict scrutiny to
void a law that limited primary voting to party members, is not controlling, and
strict scrutiny is not required in this case.  Strict scrutiny is required “only if the
burden [on associational rights] is severe,” and the burden imposed by
Oklahoma’s law is less substantial than that imposed by Connecticut’s.  The
Connecticut law required voters to affiliate publicly with a party in order to vote
in its primary; here independents need not register as Libertarians to vote in that
party’s primary, but need only declare themselves Independents.  Election laws
that do not place a heavy burden on associational rights can be justified by
“important” state regulatory interests, and Oklahoma’s law advances several
such interests.  Oklahoma asserts an interest in preserving political parties as
“viable and identifiable interest groups,” so that candidates who emerge from
primary elections represent that party’s interests, and so that the general voting
population may rely on party labels to draw inferences about candidates’
ideologies.  Oklahoma also asserts interests in aiding parties’ electioneering and
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party-building planning by promoting stability, and in preventing party raiding
and “sore loser” candidacies.
6-3.  Opinion of Court by Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Breyer.  Separate part of Thomas opinion joined by Rehnquist,
O’Connor, and Scalia.  Concurring opinion by O’Connor, joined by Breyer.
Dissenting opinion by Stevens, joined by Ginsburg, and joined in part by Souter.
Commissioner v. Banks   125 S.  Ct.  826, 73 USLW 4117   (1-24-05)
Income Tax, contingent fees: The portion of a money judgment or settlement
paid to an attorney under a contingent fee agreement is income to the client
under the Internal Revenue Code.  The Code defines “gross income” as “income
from whatever source derived.”  A taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain
from gross income by assigning the gain in advance to someone else.  A
contingent fee agreement should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the
attorney of a portion of the client’s income, and, as such, it is taxable to the
client.  In general, attribution of income is resolved by determining whether a
taxpayer exercises “dominion” over the income in question.  In litigation the
income-generating asset is the cause of action, and “the plaintiff retains
dominion over this asset throughout the litigation.”  The fact that the value of
the claim is speculative does not limit application of the assignment doctrine.
The attorney-client relationship is not a business partnership or joint venture for
tax purposes; instead, it is “a quintessential principal-agent relationship.”  When
a principal relies on an agent to realize an economic gain, that gain is treated as
income to the principal.  While it is possible that state laws could alter this
principal-agent relationship, none appear to convert the attorney from an agent
to a partner.  These cases arose prior to enactment of, and hence are not covered
by, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which allows a taxpayer to deduct
certain attorneys fees from gross income.
8-0.  Opinion of Court by Kennedy, joined by all Justices except Rehnquist, who
did not participate.
Cooper Industries v. Aviall Servs.   125 S. Ct. 577, 73 USLW 4041   (12-13-04)
Superfund, contribution, statutory construction: Section 113(f)(1) of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA, or Superfund Act) does not authorize persons who have incurred
response costs while undertaking voluntary cleanup activities to seek
contribution from other potentially responsible parties.  That paragraph specifies
that a party “may seek contribution . . . during or following” any CERCLA
action under section 106 or 107(a).  It does not authorize contribution outside
the context of such actions.  The word “may” is not used permissively to nullify
the reference to section 106 and 107 actions.  Rather, the “natural meaning of
‘may’ in the context of the enabling clause is that it authorizes certain
contribution actions . . . and no others.”  A contrary reading would render the
restriction “superfluous.”  A saving clause, providing that “nothing in this
subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for
contribution in the absence of a civil action under [section 106 or 107],” does
not change the interpretation.  The saving clause does not itself create a cause
of action; its “sole function” is to clarify that the subsection does nothing to
diminish any right of contribution that may exist independently of 113(f)(1).
The “whole” of section 113 reinforces interpretation of paragraph (f)(1).  The
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section provides one other avenue for contribution following certain approved
settlements, and then provides two separate limitations periods for seeking
contribution: one following judgments and one following settlements.  Absence
of a limitation period applicable when neither a judgment nor a settlement has
occurred, as is the case with a voluntary cleanup, suggests that paragraph (f)(1)
does not authorize contribution following voluntary cleanup.  Arguments based
on the general purposes of CERCLA are rejected.  “Given the clear meaning of
the text, there is no need . . . to consult the purpose of CERCLA at all.”
7-2.  Opinion of Court by Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer.  Dissenting opinion by Ginsburg, joined by
Stevens.
Cutter v. Wilkinson   125 S. Ct. 2113, 73 USLW 4397   (5-31-05)
Establishment Clause, RLUIPA: Section 3 of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), which provides that
governments may not impose “a substantial burden on the religious exercise”
of an institutionalized person unless the burden furthers “a compelling
governmental interest,” does not violate the Establishment Clause.  The Court
has recognized that there is “room for play in the joints” between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, and section 3 of RLUIPA
“fits within the corridor” between the two clauses.  The provision is “compatible
with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional government-
created burdens on private religious exercise.”  Moreover, RLUIPA does not run
afoul of earlier decisions that require government to take account of burdens
imposed on non-beneficiaries, and that require neutrality among different
religions.  This does not mean, however, that government must offer the same
accommodations to secular entities that it extends to religious practitioners in
order to facilitate their religious observances.  Also, RLUIPA does not “elevate
accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain
order and safety.”  “Prison security is a compelling state interest, and . . .
deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area.”  Rejection of
this facial challenge does not preclude later as-applied challenges.
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Ginsburg.  Concurring opinion by Thomas.
Deck v. Missouri   125 S. Ct. 2007, 73 USLW 4370   (5-23-05)
Due Process, physical restraint of defendant during trial: The routine
shackling of a defendant during the penalty phase of capital trial by jury violates
his due process rights.  The law has long prohibited routine use of visible
shackles during the guilt phase of a criminal trial, and the same rule should
apply to the penalty phase.  The rationales underlying the guilt-phase rule apply
with similar force at the penalty phase.  The use of physical restraints impairs
the right to counsel by interfering with an accused’s right to communicate  with
his attorney.  Maintaining a dignified process that includes the respectful
treatment of defendants underscores the seriousness and importance of the
proceedings.  Use of physical restraints undermines the presumption of
innocence that is accorded each defendant.  While the presumption of innocence
no longer applies at sentencing, “related concerns” are implicated.  The decision
between life and death “is no less important than the decision about guilt.”
Presence of the convicted defendant in shackles can be “a thumb on death’s side
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of the scale” for two important sentencing considerations: the jury’s perception
of the defendant’s character, and of the danger to the community that the
defendant presents.  Although the ban against shackling is not absolute, and
shackling may be imposed when justified by “an essential state interest” specific
to the defendant, Missouri’s claim that the shackling was justified in this case
is rejected.  The claim that the jury was unaware of the shackles is not supported
by the record.  Also lacking is evidence that the trial judge exercised discretion
by finding exceptional circumstances warranting the use of shackles.  Finally,
because shackling is “inherently prejudicial,” the defendant need not
demonstrate that actual prejudice resulted.
7-2.  Opinion of Court by Breyer, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.  Dissenting opinion by Thomas, joined by
Scalia.
Devenpeck v. Alford   125 S. Ct. 588, 73 USLW 4038   (12-13-04)
Fourth Amendment, arrest, probable cause: A warrantless arrest is valid
under the Fourth Amendment whether or not the criminal offense for which
there is probable cause to arrest is “closely related” to the offense stated by the
officer at the time of arrest.  The Ninth Circuit erred in invalidating an arrest on
the basis that  the offenses for which probable cause existed (impersonating an
officer and obstructing an officer) were not “closely related” to the offense
invoked by the officer in arresting the suspect (taping roadside conversations
with police officers in alleged violation of a state privacy law).  Existence of
probable cause depends upon “the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the
facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.”  As the Court held
in Whren v. United States (1996), an officer’s reasons for making an arrest are
irrelevant; the issue is “whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action.”  The Ninth Circuit’s “closely related” rule makes the lawfulness of
arrest turn on the officer’s motivation, and, in addition, is “condemned by its
perverse consequences.”  There is no constitutional requirement that officers
inform a person of the reason for his arrest at the time he is taken into custody,
and making the validity of arrest turn on what the officer tells the arrestee might
cause officers to cease giving any reason at all.
8-0.  Opinion of Court by Scalia.  Rehnquist did not participate.
Dodd v. United States   125 S. Ct. 2478, 73 USLW 4516   (6-20-05)
Habeas corpus, limitations period, start date:  A one-year limitation period
for a federal prisoner’s filing of a habeas corpus petition begins to run on the
date the Supreme Court initially recognized the right asserted by the prisoner,
not on the date on which the right was made retroactive for purposes of habeas
review.  28 U.S.C. § 2855 provides that the applicable limitation period begins
to run on “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”  The text of
this provision is “clear,” and “settles this dispute.”  “It unequivocally identifies
one, and only one, date from which the 1-year limitation period is measured.”
That date is the “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized.”
The petitioner’s reliance on the second clause is “misplaced.”  The second
clause “imposes a condition on the applicability” of the first.  The date
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established in the first clause “does not apply at all if the conditions in the
second clause . . . have not been met.”  There is “the potential for harsh results,”
since the Court “rarely decides that a new rule is retroactively applicable within
one year of initially recognizing that right,” but it is for Congress and not the
Court to “rewrite the statute.”  The disposition required in this case, “though
strict, is not absurd.”  The petitioner’s claim is barred because he filed it more
than a year after the Supreme Court decided the Richardson case on which he
sought to rely.  It does not matter that he filed his claim less than a year after an
appellate court had held Richardson applicable to cases on collateral review.
5-4.  Opinion of Court by O’Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.  Dissenting opinions by Stevens, joined in part by Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer; and by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer.
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo   125 S. Ct. 1627, 73 USLW 4283 (4-19-05)
Securities, fraud, proof of loss:  An allegation that the price paid for a security
was inflated because of misrepresentations is inadequate to state a cause of
action for securities fraud.  The complaint must also allege that the
misrepresentation proximately caused economic loss.  “As a matter of pure
logic,” the purchaser does not suffer loss at the time of purchase.  The purchaser
may be able to sell the shares quickly without a loss “before the relevant truth
begins to leak out,” or, if a significant amount of time elapses before resale,
subsequent events may control the shares’ value.  A purchase price inflated by
misrepresentations may prove to be “a necessary condition of any [future] loss,”
but it is not the cause of such a loss.  The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that proof
of actual economic loss is unnecessary lacks support in precedent.  The common
law of deceit and misrepresentation on which the law of securities fraud is based
requires proof of loss, and other courts of appeals have required it in securities
fraud cases.  In this case the complaint alleged that the petitioner drug company
misrepresented the likelihood of FDA approval of a particular device and that
the purchase price for shares was artificially inflated, but did not allege that the
price fell significantly after the truth became known.  The complaint was
“legally insufficient” because it failed to give the petitioner/defendant adequate
notice of the nature of the alleged loss and the causal connection to the
misrepresentations.
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Breyer.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.   125 S. Ct. 2611, 73 USLW 4574
(6-23-05)
Federal courts, supplemental jurisdiction:  If one plaintiff meets the amount-
in-controversy and other jurisdictional requirements of federal diversity
jurisdiction, the court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other
plaintiffs who do not meet the amount-in-controversy requirements.  The
supplemental jurisdiction statute, enacted in 1990, superseded Zahn v.
International Paper Co. (1973), in which the Court had held that any diversity
plaintiff not satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement must be
dismissed.  The statute provides that, with certain listed exceptions, “in any civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts
shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related
. . . that they form part of the same case or controversy.”  This is a “broad grant
of supplemental jurisdiction.”  A diversity case in which the claims of some but
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not all plaintiffs satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement presents “a civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,” and the court
therefore may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over other claims in the action
unless one of the exceptions applies.  In this case none does.  The argument that
the court must have original jurisdiction over every claim in the complaint rests
on one of two untenable theories.  The “indivisibility” theory is “inconsistent
with the whole notion of supplemental jurisdiction,” and the “contamination”
theory, appropriate in the diversity context, “makes little sense with respect to
the amount-in-controversy requirement.”  The supplemental jurisdiction statute
is “closely analogous” to the removal statute, which has been interpreted to
allow removal of state law claims along with the federal claim over which the
district court has jurisdiction.  There is no need to resort to legislative history
because the supplemental jurisdiction statute is not ambiguous.  Moreover, the
legislative history is not only “murky” and inconclusive, but reveals a “post-hoc
attempt” in the House Report to contradict what was acknowledged to be the
provision’s plain text.
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, and
Thomas.  Dissenting opinions by Stevens, joined by Breyer; and by Ginsburg,
joined by Stevens, O’Connor, and Breyer.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.   125 S. Ct. 1517, 73 USLW 4266
(3-30-05)
Federal-state court relations: The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars
losing state court litigants from obtaining federal district court review of the
state court ruling, has no application when federal court proceedings have been
initiated prior to state court judgment.  Rooker-Feldman reflects the fact that
federal district courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.
Such federal review authority is conferred solely on the Supreme Court.  There
is no interference with the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, however, if
a district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is properly invoked prior to entry of
judgment in a parallel state court action.  That situation is governed by
preclusion law.  The Full Faith and Credit Act requires a federal court to “give
the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that
State would give.”  In parallel litigation, therefore, the federal court may be
required to recognize the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, “but federal
jurisdiction over an issue does not terminate automatically on the entry of
judgment in the state court.”  In this case, Exxon Mobil “plainly has not repaired
to federal court in order to undo the Delaware judgment in its favor,” but
apparently sought “to protect itself in the event it lost in state court on grounds
(such as the state statute of limitations) that might not preclude relief in the
federal venue.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Ginsburg.
Florida v. Nixon   125 S. Ct. 551, 73 USLW 4047   (12-13-04)
Assistance of counsel, constitutional adequacy: A defense counsel’s decision,
in the absence of express consent by his client, to concede his client’s guilt in
a capital case and to concentrate on building a case to spare his client’s life does
not necessarily amount to prejudicial and ineffective assistance of counsel.  The
adequacy of a counsel’s performance, after consultation with his client yields
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neither consent nor objection to his proposed trial strategy, should be measured
by the general reasonableness standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington
(1984), and not by the presumption of prejudice created by United States v.
Cronic (1984) for cases in which counsel fails meaningfully to oppose the
prosecution’s case.  “A presumption of prejudice is not in order based solely on
a defendant’s failure to provide express consent to a tenable strategy counsel has
adequately disclosed to and discussed with the defendant.”  Although a client’s
explicit consent must be obtained before certain basic trial decisions may be
made, e.g., whether to plead guilty or waive a jury trial, what was done in this
case is not the functional equivalent.  Although the attorney conceded his
client’s guilt, the prosecution was still required to present competent, admissible
evidence establishing the essential elements of the charged offense, and
consequently there was no “truncated” proceeding.  “Attorneys representing
capital defendants face daunting challenges,” and in some instances evidence
of guilt may be so overwhelming that saving the client from execution may be
“the best and only realistic result possible.”  In such cases “counsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for attempting to impress the jury with his candor and his
unwillingness to engage in ‘a useless charade.’”
8-0.  Opinion of Court by Ginsburg.  Rehnquist did not participate.
Gonzales v. Raich   125 S. Ct. 2195, 73 USLW 4407   (6-6-05)
Commerce power; necessary and proper legislation: The Controlled
Substances Act’s (CSA’s) categorical prohibition of the manufacture and
possession of marijuana, is valid as applied to the intrastate cultivation,
possession, and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes in compliance with
California law.  Congress, pursuant to its commerce and necessary and proper
powers,  may regulate “purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class
of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Congress’
regulation of intrastate activities may cover activities that are not themselves
commercial if failure to regulate would undercut the regulation of the interstate
market in that commodity.  The case is “striking[ly] similar” to Wickard v.
Filburn (1942), in which the Court upheld a restriction on production of wheat
for home consumption.  Just as Congress had a rational basis for believing that,
in the aggregate, unregulated home-grown wheat would affect the market price
of wheat, “here too, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that leaving
home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price
and market conditions.”  Congress could rationally have been concerned about
enforcement difficulties in distinguishing between marijuana cultivated locally
and that cultivated elsewhere, and about diversion from the home-consumption
market into the commercial market.  “[T]he absence of particularized findings
[about the need to regulate medical marijuana use] does not call into question
Congress’ authority to legislate.”  The Court’s decisions in United States v.
Lopez (1995) and United States v. Morrison (2000) are not on point.  Neither
the Gun-Free School Zones Act, invalidated in Lopez, nor the Violence Against
Women Act, invalidated in Morrison, regulated economic activity, while “the
activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic.”  Also, the CSA
is “at the opposite end of the regulatory spectrum” from the Gun-Free School
Zones Act because the latter was a “discrete prohibition,” while the marijuana
prohibition in the CSA is “merely one of many ‘essential part[s]’ of a larger
regulation of economic activity.”  The CSA makes no exception for use of
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marijuana for medical purposes on the advice of a physician.  By classifying
marijuana as a Schedule I drug, Congress itself determined that marijuana has
no acceptable medical uses.
6-3.  Opinion of Court by Stevens, joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Scalia.  Dissenting opinions by O’Connor, joined
by Rehnquist and joined in part by Thomas; and by Thomas.
Gonzalez v. Crosby   125 S. Ct. 2641, 73 USLW 4568   (6-23-05)
Habeas corpus, motion for relief from judgment: A motion filed under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) challenging the federal district court’s
ruling on the statute of limitations applicable to the movant’s initial habeas
corpus petition is not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition, and can be
ruled upon by the district court without precertification by the appeals court.
Rule 60(b) authorizes motions for relief from operation of a judgment.  The rule
was not expressly circumscribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA), but federal rules apply only to the extent that they are not
“inconsistent” with the habeas statutes as amended by AEDPA.  AEDPA’s
precertification and other requirements apply if the motion amounts to a
“habeas corpus application” An “application” for habeas relief is a filing that
contains one or more “claims.”  In the habeas context, a “claim” is “an asserted
federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.”  In this case
the Rule 60(b) motion does not present a “claim” because it does not attack “the
substance of the federal court’s resolution of a claim on the merits,” but rather
attacks a “defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.”  The
motion, therefore, “is not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition.”  The
appeals court was nonetheless correct in denying the petitioner’s motion.  The
alleged defect — an incorrect ruling as to whether AEDPA’s limitations period
was tolled during the pendency of a state habeas petition — is not an
“extraordinary circumstance” that merits relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
7-2.  Opinion of Court by Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Breyer.  Dissenting
opinion by Stevens, joined by Souter.
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.   125 S. Ct. 2363, 73
USLW 4501   (6-13-05)
Federal courts, removal: Existence of a federal cause of action is not a
prerequisite to removal of a case from state to federal court on the basis of
federal question jurisdiction.  “In certain cases federal question jurisdiction will
lie over state-law claims that implicate significant federal issues.”  Federal
jurisdiction is permissible if there is a national interest in providing a federal
forum for resolution of the federal issues, and if doing so would not distort the
division of labor Congress has created between federal and state courts.  In this
case, in which the principal issue involves the type of notice a federal statute
requires the IRS to give before seizing property to satisfy a tax delinquency, a
state quiet title action may be removed.  The Government has a “strong interest”
in the collection of taxes, and “a direct interest in the availability of a federal
forum to vindicate its own administrative action.”  This result is not inconsistent
with the 1986 Merrell Dow case, which rejected federal jurisdiction in a state
tort action involving an issue of federal misbranding.  The Court in Merrell
Dow “disclaimed the adoption of any bright-line rule,” and treated the absence
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of a federal cause of action “as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the
sensitive judgments about congressional intent that [the federal question
provision] requires.”  Federal jurisdiction was rejected because accepting it
“would have attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising other
state claims with embedded federal issues.”  Here, by contrast, “because it will
be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of federal law, federal
jurisdiction to resolve [this issue] will portend only a microscopic effect on the
federal-state division of labor.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Souter.  Concurring opinion by Thomas.
Graham County Soil & Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson   125 S.
Ct. 2444, 73 USLW 4544 (6-20-05)
False Claims Act, limitation period, retaliation actions: The False Claims
Act’s six-year statute of limitations, applicable to “a civil action under section
3730,” does not apply to a retaliation action brought under section 3730(h).
“Statutory language has meaning only in context,” and in context the limitations
language of section 3731(b)(1) “is ambiguous rather than clear” as to whether
§ 3730(h) retaliation actions are civil actions under section 3730.  “Another
reasonable reading” is that only § 3730(a) actions brought by the Attorney
General to remedy violations of § 3729 [the False Claims Act’s basic
prohibition on filing false claims] and § 3730(b) qui tam actions brought by
private persons in the government’s name to remedy violations are “civil
action[s] under section 3730.”  The start of the limitations period is keyed to
“the date on which the violation of section 3729 is committed,” i.e., the date on
which the false claim was submitted.  A retaliation plaintiff does not need to
prove that a false claim was submitted, but only that his employer retaliated
against him for alleging that it was.  Two considerations argue in favor of
resolving the ambiguity by reading the six-year limitations period as applicable
only to 3730(a) and (b) actions, and not to 3730(h) retaliation actions.  First, the
very next subsection uses “action  brought under section 3730” in a context that
can refer only to (a) and (b) actions.  The provision requires the United States
to prove all elements of a § 3730 cause of action by a preponderance of the
evidence, but the United States does not normally participate in a retaliation
action.  Second, statutes of limitations normally begin to run when the cause of
action accrues.  Section 3731(b), which begins to run when the false claim is
filed, does not fit this “default rule” if applied to retaliation claims.  There is
even the possibility that a retaliation action could be time barred before it
accrues if the employer learns of the employee’s role in aiding an investigation
more than six years after the alleged violation.  Because there is no federal
limitations period applicable to retaliation actions, the case is remanded for
consideration of which state limitations period should be applied as most closely
analogous.
7-2.  Opinion of Court by Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy, and joined in part by Souter.  Concurring opinion by Stevens.
Dissenting opinion by Breyer, joined by Ginsburg.
Granholm v. Heald   125 S. Ct. 1885, 73 USLW 4321   (5-16-05)
Commerce Clause, Twenty-first Amendment: Michigan and New York laws
that allow in-state wineries to sell wine directly to consumers but prohibit or
discourage out-of-state wineries from doing so discriminate against interstate
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commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, and are not authorized by the
Twenty-first Amendment.  The Court has long held that state laws violate the
Commerce Clause if they mandate differential treatment of in-state and out-of-
state economic interests in a manner that benefits the former and burdens the
latter.  The restrictions on direct sale by out-of-state wineries constitute such
prohibited discrimination.  Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which
prohibits the “transportation or importation into any State . . . for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof,” “does not allow
States to regulate the direct shipment of wine on terms that discriminate in favor
of in-state producers.”  The Twenty-first Amendment repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment, which had imposed nationwide Prohibition, and restored to the
states the powers they had prior to Prohibition.  Those powers were shaped by
the Wilson Act, which authorized states to regulate imported liquor on the same
terms that they regulate domestic liquor, and the Webb-Kenyon Act, which
closed a loophole that had left states powerless to regulate direct imports for
personal use.  Although some of the early cases interpreting the Twenty-first
Amendment did not take account of this history, modern cases have recognized
that “state regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of
the Commerce Clause.”  Discrimination can be upheld if the state “advances a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives,” but neither Michigan nor New York has done
so.  The states’ assertion that direct shipping of wine is likely to increase alcohol
consumption by minors is “unsupported,” and in any event does not justify a
distinction between direct shipments from in-state producers and direct
shipments from out-of-state producers.  A “tax collection justification is also
insufficient.”  Michigan does not rely on wholesalers to collect its taxes on
imported wines, and New York could protect itself by requiring a permit for
direct shipping.  Objectives underlying other asserted rationales could “also be
achieved through the alternative of an evenhanded licensing requirement.”
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Kennedy, joined by Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Dissenting opinions by Stevens, joined by O’Connor; and by Thomas,
joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, and O’Connor.
Halbert v. Michigan   125 S. Ct. 2582, 73 USLW 4600   (6-23-05)
Assistance of counsel, appeal following guilty plea: Indigent criminal
defendants who plead nolo contendere or guilty in Michigan courts are entitled
to the appointment of counsel to seek “first-tier review” in the Michigan Court
of Appeals.  In Douglas v. California (1963), the court held that states must
appoint counsel to represent indigents in first appeals as of right.  Under Ross
v. Moffitt (1974), however, indigents are not entitled to appointment of counsel
for subsequent discretionary appeals to the state’s highest court or to the U.S.
Supreme Court.  Although first-tier review for Michigan defendants who plead
guilty or nolo contendere is discretionary with the court and not by right,
Douglas and not Ross “provides the controlling instruction.”  Michigan has a
two-tier appellate system under which the first tier, like California’s first-tier
review at issue in Douglas, serves an error-correction function.  Indigent
defendants seeking first-tier review “are generally ill equipped to represent
themselves” in such proceedings.  A pro se litigant will lack a record that has
been reviewed by appellate counsel and will have no attorney’s brief or
appellate court opinion to help him identify and sharpen issues.  In addition,
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persons like the respondent, who have mental impairment, learning disabilities,
and little education, “are particularly handicapped as self-representatives.”
6-3.  Opinion of Court by Ginsburg, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, and Breyer.  Dissenting opinion by Thomas, joined by Scalia, and joined
in part by Rehnquist.
Illinois v. Caballes   125 S.  Ct.  834, 73 USLW 4111   (1-24-05)
Fourth Amendment, dog sniff at traffic stop: A dog sniff for drugs conducted
around the perimeter of a car following a legitimate traffic stop does not violate
the Fourth Amendment if the duration of the stop is justified by the traffic
offense.  Police need not have any reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug
activity before using trained narcotics detection dogs to sniff for drugs at traffic
stops.  Official conduct that does not compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy is not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment, and there is no
legitimate privacy interest in possessing contraband.  Properly conducted dog
sniffs with properly trained dogs “are generally likely to reveal only the
presence of contraband,” and “generally do[ ] not implicate legitimate privacy
interests.”  A 2001 decision (Kyllo v. United States) invalidating the use of a
thermal imaging device to detect activity within a home is distinguished; the
thermal imaging device was capable of detecting lawful activity and thus
infringed reasonable expectations of privacy in the home.
6-2.  Opinion of Court by Stevens, joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer.  Dissenting opinions by Souter; and by Ginsburg, joined by
Souter.  Rehnquist did not participate.
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.   125 S. Ct. 1497, 73 USLW 4233   (3-29-05)
Title IX, retaliation as sex discrimination: The private right of action implied
by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation, and consequently a male high
school girls’ basketball coach relieved of his duties after complaining of
unequal treatment of his team may maintain a Title IX suit.  The Court has
previously held that Title IX’s prohibition against discrimination “on the basis
of sex” by any educational program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance extends to intentional discrimination, and retaliation against a person
who has complained of sex discrimination is a form of intentional sex
discrimination.  The fact that Title IX makes no mention of retaliation does not
limit its application; the term “discrimination” covers a wide range of treatment.
Nor is the scope of Title IX limited by contrast with Title VII, which explicitly
prohibits retaliation.  Title VII spells out a number of practices that constitute
prohibited discrimination.  “Because Congress did not list any specific
discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX, its failure to mention one such
practice does not tell us anything about whether it intended that practice to be
covered.”  Moreover, the Court “presume[s]” that Congress, when it enacted
Title IX, was “thoroughly familiar” with a decision three years earlier in which
the Court had interpreted a civil rights statute as authorizing suit by a white
person expelled from a recreational association for leasing his share to a non-
white.  A recent decision that restricted the scope of Title VI private actions by
contrasting broad regulatory and narrower statutory prohibitions is
distinguished; here the Court does not rely on regulations “because the statute
itself contains the necessary prohibition.”  Title IX retaliation actions may be
brought by persons who were not the victims of the original complaint; Title IX
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does not limit its application, as some other civil rights provisions do, to
discrimination on the basis of “such individual’s” characteristics.  Because Title
IX was an exercise of Congress’ spending power, private damage actions may
be recognized only if the recipients of federal funding had adequate notice that
they could be liable for the conduct at issue.  Here there was adequate notice.
Funding recipients have long been on notice that they could be subjected to
private suits for intentional sex discrimination, and that courts have consistently
interpreted Title IX’s private right of action broadly to encompass diverse forms
of intentional sex discrimination.  Regulations prohibiting retaliation have been
on the books for nearly 30 years, and, prior to the conduct at issue in this case,
appeals courts had interpreted Title IX to prohibit retaliation.
5-4.  Opinion of Court by O’Connor, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Dissenting opinion by Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Kennedy.
Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement   125 S. Ct. 694, 73 USLW 4090   
(1-12-05)
Statutory interpretation; Immigration, removal of alien: The provision of
immigration law that governs selection of the country to which an alien is to be
removed from the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2), does not require the
explicit, advance consent of that country’s government when the alien is ordered
removed to his country of birth pursuant to § 1231(b)(2)(E)(iv).  The statute
provides a series of removal options.  The last option, clause (vii) of
subparagraph (E), provides that if the preceding options are “impracticable,
inadvisable, or impossible,” the alien shall be removed to “another country
whose government will accept the alien into that country.”  No such acceptance
requirement appears in clauses (i) through (vi).  The fact that effects are
attached to non-acceptance throughout the rest of paragraph (2) makes the
failure to specify any such effect in most of subparagraph (E) “conspicuous” and
“more likely intentional.”  Use of the word “another” in clause (vii) does not
import the acceptance requirement into clauses (i) through (vi).  That
construction would run contrary to the rule of the last antecedent and to the
structure of subparagraph (E), under which “each clause is distinct and ends
with a period.”  Nor does the structure of paragraph (2) as a whole manifest a
uniform acceptance requirement; the fact that the Attorney General “may
disregard” an alien’s selection under paragraph (A) when a country has not
consented suggests discretion to proceed without advance consent.  To infer an
acceptance requirement when Congress has not clearly created one “would run
counter to [the Court’s] customary deference to the President in matters of
foreign affairs.”  There was no settled interpretation that would warrant the
conclusion that Congress’ 1996 amendments ratified that interpretation.  Neither
of the two requirements for such “reenactment” were present: the provisions on
removal were not reenacted without change (the removal provision combined
what had been the two separate procedures of deportation and exclusion), and
the presumed judicial consensus was not “so broad that we must presume
Congress knew of and endorsed it.”
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas.  Dissenting opinion by Souter, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
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Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n   125 S. Ct. 2055, 73 USLW 4350   (5-23-05)
First Amendment, compelled speech, government speech: A mandatory
assessment of beef producers to promote advertising of beef and beef products
does not compel them to subsidize speech in violation of the First Amendment.
The beef promotions are government speech that the government may support
through assessments.  Although in general individuals may not be compelled to
subsidize private speech with which they disagree, compelled support of
government through taxes and assessments is “perfectly constitutional,” and
support of government can entail support of government speech.  United States
v. United Foods (2001), invalidating an assessment for mushroom advertising,
is distinguished as based on the assumption that the advertising was private
speech, not government speech.  The Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985
announces a federal policy of promoting the marketing and consumption of beef
and beef products, and directs the Secretary of Agriculture to implement the
policy by creating a Beef Board composed of beef producers and importers, and
by imposing an assessment to fund promotional campaigns. Although the Beef
Board and its operating committee play a role in developing the promotional
campaigns, the content of the promotions “is effectively controlled by the
Federal Government itself.”  The act requires that the promotional campaign
include advertising “to advance the image and desirability” of beef products,
requires that the campaign take into account different types of beef products,
and prohibits reference to brand and trade names.  Details of the advertising are
developed by the Beef Board, but the Secretary of Agriculture must approve
“every word that is disseminated.”  This degree of government supervision and
control makes reliance on the government speech doctrine appropriate.  The fact
that the advertising is funded by a targeted assessment rather than by general tax
revenues has no bearing on whether the speech is government speech or private
speech, and does not change the compelled-subsidy analysis.  Crediting the
advertising to “America’s Beef Producers” does not affect the validity of the
facial challenge to the compelled subsidy, and an as-applied challenge to
individual ads is not sufficiently supported in the record.
6-3.  Opinion of Court by Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Thomas, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinions by Thomas, by Breyer, and by Ginsburg.
Dissenting opinions by Kennedy; and by Souter, joined by Stevens and Kennedy.
Johnson v. California   125 S.  Ct.  1141, 73 USLW 4137   (2-23-05)
Equal protection, racial segregation in prisons: Strict scrutiny is the proper
standard of review for judging the validity of the California Department of
Corrections’ unwritten policy of racially segregating prisoners in double cells
for a 60-day period after they enter a new correctional facility.  The Court has
previously stated that reviewing courts must analyze under strict scrutiny “all
racial classifications” imposed by government, and in Brown v. Board of
Education (1954) rejected the idea that “separate” can ever be “equal.”  Strict
scrutiny “is no less important” in the prison context.  The CDC’s invitation to
apply the deferential standard of Turner v. Safley (1987), applicable to prison
regulations generally, is rejected.  Turner has not been applied to racial
classifications, and the right to be free from racial discrimination “is not
susceptible to the logic of Turner.”  The necessities of prison security and
discipline “are a compelling government interest,” but that interest justifies
“only those uses of race that are narrowly tailored to address those necessities.”
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5-3.  Opinion of Court by O’Connor, joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Ginsburg, joined by Souter and Breyer.
Dissenting opinions by Stevens; and by Thomas, joined by Scalia.  Rehnquist did
not participate.
Johnson v. California   125 S. Ct. 2410, 73 USLW 4460 (6-13-05)
Jury selection, racial discrimination: California courts erred in requiring a
defendant, in order to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in
jury selection, to show that it is “more likely than not” that the prosecutor’s
peremptory challenges were based on racial grounds.  The “more likely than
not” standard “is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure the sufficiency
of a prima facie case” under Batson v. Kentucky (1986).  Batson held that a
prima facie case of discrimination can be established through “a wide variety
of evidence, so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives rise to an inference
of discriminatory purpose.”  The function of a prima facie case is not to
persuade the judge that racial discrimination occurred, but merely to create an
inference and to shift the burden to the state to offer permissible race-neutral
reasons for its peremptory challenges.  It is the third stage of the process, after
the defendant has presented a prima facie case and the state has offered its
justification, when the judge weighs the likelihood that racial discrimination
occurred.  In this case, as in Batson, the prosecution struck all black persons on
the venire and the trial judge failed to demand an explanation from the
prosecution “despite the fact that the [defendant’s] evidence supported an
inference of discrimination.”
8-1.  Opinion of Court by Stevens, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Breyer.
Dissenting opinion by Thomas.
Johnson v. United States   125 S. Ct. 1571, 73 USLW 4270 (4-4-05)
AEDPA, limitations period: When a prisoner brings a habeas corpus petition
challenging his federal sentence on the basis that a state conviction used to
enhance his federal sentence has been vacated, the one-year statute of
limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) begins to run when the prisoner receives notice of the order vacating
his state sentence.  AEDPA provides that the one-year period begins to run on
“the date on which the facts supporting the claim . . .  could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”  The state court vacatur order
is the “fact[ ] supporting the claim” for purposes of this rule.  There is still the
problem, however, of how to implement the “due diligence” requirement when
it is the petitioner’s own actions that initiate the state vacatur proceedings.
“Diligence can be shown by prompt action [by] the petitioner as soon as he is
in a position to realize that he has an interest in challenging the prior conviction
with its potential to enhance the later sentence.”  The diligence requirement is
best activated on the date of federal judgment, not the date of the federal
indictment or the date the judgment becomes final.  In this case the petitioner
waited more that three years after entry of judgment in his federal case before
filing his state petition.  The petitioner pointed to the fact that he had been
acting pro se and lacked knowledge of the procedure, but his delay “fell far
short of reasonable diligence in challenging the state conviction.”
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9-0 (vacatur as fact starting limitation period); 5-4 (due diligence).   Opinion of
Court by Souter, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Thomas, and Breyer.
Dissenting opinion by Kennedy, joined by Stevens, Scalia, and Ginsburg.
Kansas v. Colorado   125 S. Ct. 526, 73 USLW 4021   (12-7-04)
Arkansas River Compact, water allocation: Kansas’ objections to the special
master’s report recommending resolution of remaining disputes over allocation
of Arkansas River water under the Arkansas River Compact are overruled.
Kansas’ request for appointment of a river master is denied.  The special master
has not requested appointment of a river master, future issues may be resolvable
by arbitration, and questions that may arise about assumptions underlying the
complex hydrologic computer model used to estimate river flow may call for
“highly judgmental decisionmaking” more related to the parties’ basic legal
claims than to the kinds of factual issues ordinarily handled by river masters.
The special master’s determination to calculate prejudgment interest only on
damages incurred from 1985 onward, and not for earlier periods, was implicitly
approved in prior litigation, and Kansas’ objection that prejudgment interest
should be based upon earlier damages is overruled.  The State’s objections to
the methodology for applying the computer model, arguing that a one-year
measurement period rather than a 10-year period should be used, are also
rejected.  The compact’s language does not resolve the issue, and “practical
considerations” favor the 10-year approach.  The special master’s allocation to
the Colorado Water Court of initial responsibility for determining the amounts
of replacement credits to be applied to Colorado’s compact obligations is
permissible, given Kansas’ right to seek review in the Supreme Court.  The
special master’s decision to postpone decision on other matters is also justified.
9-0, 8-1.  Opinion of Court by Breyer, unanimous in part, and joined in separate
parts by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.
Concurring opinion by Thomas.  Concurring and dissenting opinion by Stevens
(dissenting as to basis for calculating prejudgment interest).
Kelo v. City of New London   125 S. Ct. 2655, 73 USLW 4552   (6-23-05)
Taking of property, “public use”:  The city’s condemnation of private
property for an economic development project meets the “public use”
requirement of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.  The city’s plan,
designed to create jobs, increase tax revenues, and revitalize an economically
distressed downtown and waterfront area, authorizes private and commercial
development, including a conference hotel, restaurants and shopping, new
residences, and a marina.  Although the “public use” restriction prevents the
government from taking the property of one private entity for the sole purpose
of transferring it to another private entity, there is no requirement that
condemned property be made available for use by the general public.  Rather,
the Court has long “embraced the broader and more natural interpretation of
public use as ‘public purpose,’” and has construed the term “public purpose”
“broadly, reflecting [a] longstanding policy of deference to legislative
judgments.”  Economic development qualifies as a public purpose.  Even
though New London was not faced with the need to remove “blight” from the
redevelopment area, and consequently Berman v. Parker (1954) is not directly
on point, the city’s “determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to
justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to . . . deference.”  A
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public purpose “may be as well or better served through an agency of private
enterprise than through a department of government,” and the fact that the
revitalization will benefit certain private parties does not require its invalidation.
There is no requirement of “reasonable certainty” that public benefits will
accrue from a condemnation; judicial inquiry ends “when the legislature’s
purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational.”  So too, courts will not
“second-guess [government’s] determinations as to what lands it needs to
acquire.”
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Stevens, joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Kennedy.  Dissenting opinions by O’Connor,
joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas; and by Thomas.
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh   125 S. Ct. 460, 73 USLW 4013   (11-30-04)
Truth in Lending Act, statutory construction: 1995 amendments to the Truth
in Lending Act did not alter the liability limits applicable to loans secured by
personal property.  The civil liability limits are contained in 15 U.S.C. §
1640(a)(2)(A).  Prior to amendment in 1995 that subparagraph contained two
clauses, the first of which (clause i) authorized damages of twice the finance
charge for actions on secured loans, and the second of which (clause ii),
applicable to consumer leases, capped damages at not less than $100 nor more
that $1000 for “liability under this subparagraph.”  Appellate courts had
interpreted the limit in clause (ii) as applicable to loan actions covered by clause
(i).  Congress in 1995 amended the subparagraph by adding a third clause (iii),
raising the cap to the $200-2,000 range for a category of transactions formerly
covered by clause (i) — closed-end loans secured by real property.  Congress
did not alter the language of the liability limitation in clause (ii).  The
“conventional meaning of ‘subparagraph’” suggests applicability to (i) as well
as (ii), and the “statutory history” resolves any ambiguities created by the odd
placement of the limitation within the second of three clauses.  If Congress had
intended to “repeal the longstanding” understanding that this liability limitation
applied to actions covered by (i) as well as those covered by (ii), it “likely would
have flagged that substantial change” or at least would have amended the
language to apply to “liability under this clause.”  The evident intent was to
increase possible recovery for loans secured by real property, not to change the
cap for loans secured by personal property.
8-1.  Opinion of Court by Ginsburg, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer.  Concurring opinions by Stevens, joined by
Breyer; by Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist; and by Thomas.  Dissenting opinion
by Scalia.
Kowalski v. Tesmer   125 S. Ct. 564, 73 USLW 4033   (12-13-04)
Third-party standing: Attorneys lack third-party standing to assert the rights
of indigents denied appointed appellate counsel after pleading guilty in
Michigan state courts.  As a general rule, a litigant must assert his own legal
rights, and may not rest his claim to relief on the legal rights of third parties.
Narrow exceptions are recognized, however, if the party asserting the right has
a “close relationship” to the person who possesses the right, or if there is a
“hindrance” to assertion of the right by the person possessing it.  Unlike an
existing attorney-client relationship, a possible “future attorney-client
relationship with as yet unascertained Michigan criminal defendants” does not
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qualify as a “close relationship” on which third-party standing can be built.
And, while an attorney “would be valuable,” the lack of an attorney is not “the
type of hindrance necessary to allow another to assert the indigent defendants’
rights.”  The attorneys here could have attended state court to assist the indigent
defendants there.  Also, the three indigent defendants who were originally
plaintiffs in this federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were appropriately
dismissed under Younger v. Harris because they had ongoing state criminal
proceedings that afforded them ample opportunity to raise their constitutional
challenge.
6-3.  Opinion of Court by Rehnquist, joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Thomas.  Dissenting opinion by
Ginsburg, joined by Stevens and Souter.
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.   125 S. Ct. 542, 73 USLW
4028   (12-8-04)
Trademarks, infringement, fair use defense: A party raising the statutory
affirmative defense of fair use to a claim of trademark infringement does not
have the burden of demonstrating that the complained-of practice is unlikely to
confuse consumers about the origin of the goods or services affected.  A
plaintiff claiming infringement of an incontestable mark under the Lanham Act
must show likelihood of consumer confusion as part of the prima facie case
“[T]he defendant has no independent burden to negate the likelihood of any
confusion in raising the affirmative defense that a term is used descriptively, not
as a mark, fairly, and in good faith.”  The fact that Congress made consumer
confusion an explicit part of the plaintiff’s case and omitted any mention of it
in describing the affirmative defense raises a presumption that the omission was
intentional.  The fair use concept does not incorporate the likelihood-of-
confusion test.  Under the Lanham Act and under common law, “some
possibility of consumer confusion [is] compatible with fair use.”  Trademark
law is not designed “to deprive commercial speakers of the ordinary utility of
descriptive words,” and for that reason descriptive terms can qualify for
trademark protection “only after taking on secondary meaning as distinctive of
the applicant’s goods.”  Moreover, placing the burden on the defendant to
establish “nonconfusion” would create statutory “incoherence.”  The function
of an affirmative defense is not to rebut the plaintiff’s case, but instead to raise
a bar to relief even if the prima facie case is sound.  “[I]t is only when a plaintiff
has shown likely confusion by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant
could have any need of an affirmative defense.” 
9-0.  Opinion of Court by Souter, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg; and joined in part by Scalia, and in separate
part by Breyer.
Leocal v. Ashcroft   125 S. Ct. 377, 73 USLW 4001   (11-9-04)
Immigration, deportation for “crime of violence”: The Florida crime of
driving under the influence [DUI] and causing serious bodily injury is not a
“crime of violence” for which a lawful permanent resident alien may be
deported.  Under the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA], an alien convicted
of an “aggravated felony” may be deported, and aggravated felony is defined to
include “a crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.  That provision, in
turn, defines “crime of violence” to mean (a) an offense that has as an element
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the use of force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other felony
that, “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be
used in the course of committing the offense.”  Primary focus on the word “use”
is too narrow; instead, the word should be construed “in light of the terms
surrounding it.”  Because the “ordinary or natural” meaning of using physical
force against someone suggests a higher degree of intent than negligent or
accidental conduct, the DUI offense is not a crime of violence under (a).  And,
while (b) “sweeps more broadly,” it “does not thereby encompass all negligent
misconduct.”  That provision simply covers offenses, such as burglary, that, by
their nature, involve the risk that the use of physical force may become
necessary in completing the crime.  This interpretation is reinforced by another
provision of the INA that renders inadmissible certain aliens who have
previously committed “any crime of violence . . . or any [DUI offense].”  If
possible, each part of a statute must be given meaning, and the separate
provision for DUI offenses would be rendered superfluous if such offenses were
encompassed within the definition of “crime of violence.”  The fact that
Congress enacted the two separate INA references to “crime of violence” just
nine months apart strengthens the argument that they should be interpreted
similarly.
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Rehnquist.
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.   125 S. Ct. 2074, 73 USLW 4343   (5-23-05)
Fifth Amendment, regulatory taking of property:  The Agins v. Tiburon test
for whether government regulation of private property constitutes a taking for
which compensation is required by the Fifth Amendment is not a valid method
for identifying regulatory takings.  The Agins test, which finds a taking if the
regulation “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests,” derives
from due process analysis, and “has no proper place in . . . takings
jurisprudence.”  The “paradigmatic taking” is a government appropriation of
property.  The three principal categories of regulatory actions that have been
found to be the “functional equivalent” of government appropriation — a
permanent physical invasion of property, however small; deprivation of all
economically beneficial use of property; and interference with “legitimate
property interests” in violation of the Penn Central test — all focus on “the
severity of the burden” imposed on the property owner.  The Agins
“substantially advances” test instead “probes the regulation’s underlying
validity” by focusing on whether the regulation is effective in achieving some
legitimate purpose.  This approach “reveals nothing about the magnitude or
character of the burden [imposed] upon private property rights,” or about “how
any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners.”  The legitimacy
of a regulation may be an appropriate due process inquiry, “but is logically prior
to and distinct from” a takings inquiry.  The Takings Clause presupposes that
the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose, and inquires
whether that legitimate regulation has taken private property for public use.  In
tailoring its claim to Agins, Chevron has not alleged “that it has been singled out
to bear any particularly severe regulatory burden,” and thus has not alleged a
takings violation.  Consequently, Chevron should not have been granted
summary judgment on its challenge to Hawaii’s limitation on the rent that oil
companies may charge dealers who lease company-owned service stations. 
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9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by O’Connor.  Concurring opinion by
Kennedy.
Mayle v. Felix   125 S. Ct. 2562, 73 USLW 4590   (6-23-05)
Habeas corpus, limitations period, amendment of petition:  An amendment
of a habeas corpus petition does not relate back to the original filing when it
asserts a new ground of relief supported by facts that differ in both time and
type from those the original pleading set forth.  Such an amendment, therefore,
must be filed within the one-year limitations period prescribed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).  The petitioner’s self-
incrimination claim, based on allegedly coerced and inculpatory statements
made during police interrogation, cannot relate back to his initial petition, which
raised a confrontation issue stemming from the prosecution’s use of a
videotaped recording of a witness.  The habeas statute allows amendment of
pleadings as provided in the rules of procedure, and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c)(2) provides that amendments relate back to the date of the
original pleading if they arise out of “the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth . . . in the original pleading.”  The “key” words “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” refer to the “a common core of operative facts,” not to the same
trial, conviction, or sentence.  Interpretation is guided by the fact that
requirements are more stringent for an original habeas petition than for a civil
complaint.  Habeas Corpus Rule 2(c) requires that a petition “specify all the
grounds for relief” and “state the facts supporting each ground.”  The fact that
the petitioner’s confrontation and self-incrimination claims would have to be
pleaded discretely as an initial matter suggests that “[e]ach separate congeries
of facts supporting the grounds for relief . . . would delineate an ‘occurrence’”
for purposes of amendment.  If claims asserted after AEDPA’s one year period
has run could relate back to an initial filing simply because they relate to the
same conviction, trial, or sentence, the limitation period “would have slim
significance,” and Congress’s purpose of advancing the finality of criminal
convictions could be thwarted.
7-2.  Opinion of Court by Ginsburg, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer.  Dissenting opinion by Souter, joined by Stevens.
McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky   125 S. Ct. 2722, 73 USLW 4639   (6-27-05)
Establishment Clause, displays of Ten Commandments:  Displays of the Ten
Commandments in the courthouses of two Kentucky counties violate the
Establishment Clause.  A determination of the counties’ purpose in erecting the
displays is a proper basis for evaluating the Establishment Clause issue.  The
Lemon v. Kurtzman test of whether a governmental action has a secular
legislative purpose “serves an important function.”  The First Amendment
requires neutrality among religions, and between religion and nonreligion, and
when government acts with the purpose of advancing religion, it violates the
“central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality.”  “By
showing a purpose to favor religion, the government ‘sends the . . . message to
nonadherents “that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community.”’” Examination of legislative purpose is “a staple of statutory
interpretation,” and need not be abandoned as impractical; legislative purpose
can sometimes be gleaned “from readily discoverable fact.”  Although courts
will often accept a governmental statement of secular purpose, the secular
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purpose must be genuine, not a sham, and courts may look behind the asserted
purpose.  Evaluation of the counties’ claim of secular purpose for the current
displays may take into account the evolution of the displays.  “The same
governmental action may be constitutional if taken in the first instance and
unconstitutional if it has a sectarian heritage.”  The counties’ original displays
had “two obvious similarities” to the classroom display invalidated in Stone v.
Graham (1980): they set out the text of the Ten Commandments, “an
unmistakably religious statement,” and they displayed that religious text in
isolation, not in a context that included nonreligious messages.  Subsequent
modifications of the displays did not change their religious purpose; an
“indisputable” religious purpose was evident in the resolutions authorizing  the
second display, and statements of purpose accompanying authorization of the
third displays “were presented only as a litigating position.”  There is “ample
support for the District Court’s finding of a predominantly religious purpose
behind the Counties’ third display.”
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Souter, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinion by O’Connor.  Dissenting opinion by Scalia, joined
by Rehnquist and Thomas, and joined in part by Kennedy.
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.   125 S. Ct. 2372, 73 USLW 4468   (6-13-05)
Patents, infringement, preclinical studies: Use of patented inventions in
preclinical drug studies is exempted from infringement so long as there is
reasonable basis to believe that the compound tested could be the subject of an
FDA submission and that the experiments will produce the types of information
that are relevant to an application to investigate or market a new drug.  The
relevant statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), provides that “it shall not be an act of
infringement” to use a patented invention “solely for uses reasonably related to
the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”  The Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) is such a law.  The language provides a “wide berth,”
extending the exemption to “all uses of patented drugs that are reasonably
related to the development and submission of any information under the
FDCA.”  “This necessarily includes preclinical studies of patented compounds
that are appropriate for submission to the FDA in the regulatory process.”  The
exemption can apply to all types of preclinical data, including that related to a
drug’s efficacy, and is not limited to data relating to the safety of a drug in
humans.  Also, the exemption can cover experimentation on drugs that are not
ultimately the subject of an FDA submission, and can cover the use of patented
compounds in experiments that are not ultimately submitted to the FDA.  This
means that the exemption is not limited to “activities necessary to seek approval
of a generic drug.”  The test is whether the experimental uses are “reasonably
related to the process of developing information for submission.”  The
exemption’s breadth thus accommodates the fact that “scientific testing is a
process of trial and error.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Scalia.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.   125 S. Ct. 2764, 73 USLW 4675
 (6-27-05)
Copyright, liability for secondary infringement: One who distributes a
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
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clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.  The respondents Grokster
and StreamCast, who distributed free software products that allow computer
users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks, may be held liable
under this principle for copyright violations by users who share copyrighted
music and video files.  The case is not controlled by Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios (1984), in which the Court held that there was no secondary
infringement in the sale of VCRs; even though VCRs could be used for
infringement, the Court found that their principal use was for time-shifting, a
fair use.  Sony did not displace all theories of secondary infringement, and did
not involve active encouragement of infringement beyond the mere fact of
distribution.  The patent law rule on inducement of infringement is also
appropriate for copyright.  Active encouragement of direct infringement by
others, through advertisements or other action, can support liability for
infringement.  Evidence showed that nearly 90% of the files available for
download through Grokster’s FastTrack system were copyrighted works, and
both respondents conceded that most uses of their products were infringing.
Both companies attempted to satisfy a “known source of demand for copyright
infringement” by soliciting former users of Napster, “a notorious file-sharing
service” that had been sued for infringement.  Neither company attempted to
develop filtering tools or other methods to diminish infringing activity by users.
Moreover, the respondents’ revenues, derived exclusively from sale of
advertising directed to users’ computers, were dependent on the high-volume,
infringing uses.  In addition to the evidence of intent to bring about
infringement, there was undisputed evidence of actual infringement “on a
gigantic scale.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Souter.  Concurring opinions by Ginsburg,
joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy; and by Breyer, joined by Stevens and
O’Connor.
Mid-Con Freight Systems v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n   125 S. Ct. 2427, 73 USLW
4535   (6-20-05)
Preemption, state registration of trucks:  Michigan’s $100 fee imposed on
Michigan-licensed trucks operating entirely in interstate commerce is not a
“State registration requirement” that is preempted by the federal statute that
creates a single-state registration system (SSRS).  The SSRS statute replaced a
“bingo-card” system under which carriers had to register with each state, and
allows an interstate carrier to register with a single “base” state by proving that
it has secured a federal permit for operation of an interstate truck.  The statute
provides that a state “requirement” that an interstate carrier must “register with
the state” is not an unreasonable burden on transportation when it is completed
in accordance with federal standards, and that an unreasonable burden is created
“when a State registration requirement imposes obligations in excess of
[federal] standards.”  The prohibition of “state registration requirement[s]” in
excess of federal standards does not apply to every state registration
requirement, but rather applies only to those requirements that concern SSRS
registration.  The “statutory language makes clear that the federal provision
reaches no further.”  The reference in the first sentence to registration in
compliance with federal requirements means compliance with the SSRS
obligations imposed by the statute, and “the same words in the second sentence”
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cannot refer to “something totally different.”  There is no language elsewhere
in the statute suggesting a broader meaning for “State registration requirement”;
the whole focus of the statute is on SSRS standards.  Nor is a broader reading
suggested by anything in “the statute’s basic purposes or objectives.”
Michigan’s $100 fee on interstate trucks does not concern SSRS registration,
and therefore is not preempted by the provision.  The Michigan statute imposing
the fee makes no reference to a federal permit or to other SSRS matters,
Michigan imposed the fee before SSRS existed, and a carrier can comply with
the SSRS requirements without paying the Michigan fee.
6-3.  Opinion of Court by Breyer, joined by Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg.  Dissenting opinion by Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist and O’Connor.
Miller-El v. Dretke   125 S. Ct. 2317, 73 USLW 4479   (6-13-05)
Jury selection, racial discrimination: The petitioner should prevail on his
claim that the prosecutor’s purposeful exclusion of blacks from his jury
deprived him of equal protection.  Batson v. Kentucky (1986) set the framework
for analysis of such claims.  A defendant can establish a prima facie case of
discriminatory jury selection from the totality of the relevant facts about a
prosecutor’s actions, and the state can rebut this case by establishing a neutral
explanation for its actions.  The trial judge then determines whether the
defendant has proved purposeful racial discrimination.  In this case, “the
numbers describing the prosecution’s use of [peremptory challenges] are
remarkable.”  Only one of the 20 black members of the venire panel was
selected; nine were excused for cause, but ten were peremptorily struck.  The
one black juror who served was accepted late in the selection process when the
prosecutor was running low on peremptories and had to save them for remaining
panelists known to oppose the death penalty.  Even “more powerful” is a
comparison of some of the black panelists who were struck with white panelists
who were allowed to serve; the prosecution’s reasons for striking these black
panelists “appeared equally on point as to some white jurors who served.”
Broader patterns of discriminatory practices are also apparent.  The prosecution
used a “jury shuffling” procedure, rearranging the order in which members of
the panel are seated and questioned, when a number of blacks were at the front
of the line, and requested another shuffle when blacks again appeared at the
front.  The prosecutor also used contrasting voir dire questions for blacks and
whites, describing capital punishment in general terms when questioning whites
as to their views, but using a “graphic script” for blacks; and depriving blacks
of information, provided to whites, that would have enabled them to avoid for-
cause disqualification.  Finally, there was evidence that Dallas County
prosecutors had long followed “a specific policy of systematically excluding
blacks from juries.”
6-3.  Opinion of Court by Souter, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Breyer.  Dissenting opinion by
Thomas, joined by Rehnquist and Scalia.
Muehler v.  Mena   125 S. Ct. 1465, 73 USLW 4211   (3-22-05)
Fourth Amendment, detention during search: While conducting a search of
a house pursuant to a warrant to search for weapons and evidence of gang
activity, officers may detain occupants in handcuffs.  It is well established that
officers executing a warrant to search premises may detain the occupants during
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the search.  Officers may use reasonable force to effectuate such a detention.
In this case — “no ordinary search” because it entailed a search for weapons in
a house in which a wanted gang member resided — use of handcuffs was
reasonable, and the 2- to 3- hour duration of handcuffed detention was also
reasonable.  Questioning the handcuffed detainee about her immigration status
did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.  Because there was no finding that
the detention was prolonged by the questioning, the questioning did not
constitute an additional seizure, and the officers did not need reasonable
suspicion to inquire as to the detainee’s name, date and place of birth, and
immigration status.
9-0.  Opinion of Court by Rehnquist, joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.  Concurring opinions by Kennedy; and by Stevens, joined by Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.
National Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.   125 S. Ct. 2688, 73
USLW 4659   (6-27-05)
Telecommunications, regulation of broadband Internet providers: The
FCC’s determination that cable companies that sell broadband Internet service
do not provide “telecommunications service” and hence are exempt from
mandatory common-carrier regulation under the Communications Act of 1934,
is a lawful construction that is entitled to deference under the principles of
Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC (1984).  The appeals court’s refusal to apply Chevron
because the Commission’s interpretation conflicted with an earlier decision by
that court was in error.  The appeals court’s earlier decision had determined the
“best” reading of the statute, not that its reading was the only permissible one.
Under Chevron, courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of
statutes they administer unless the statute speaks directly to the issue and
requires a different interpretation.  The Commission’s determination that
provision of cable modem service is not an “offering” of a “telecommunications
service” is a “permissible” reading of the statute.  The act distinguishes between
“telecommunications service” and “information service,” and the commission
determined that cable modem service is an “information service,” not an
“telecommunications service.”  The term “telecommunications” is defined as
the transmission of information without change in its form or content, but cable
modem service provides users with the information-processing capabilities of
Internet access.  From the consumer’s and the Commission’s point of view,
cable modem service has an “integrated character,” and the transmission of
information is “a necessary component of Internet access.”  The term “offer” is
ambiguous. “Offering” of telecommunications service “can reasonably be read
to mean a ‘stand-alone’ offering” not bundled with information services.  Cable
companies that provide Internet service “offer” an information service “via
telecommunications,” but that does not necessarily mean that they “offer”
telecommunications service.  The distinction between telecommunications and
information services “substantially incorporated” the Commission’s traditional
distinction between “basic” and “enhanced” service.  The Commission’s
interpretation was “a reasonable policy choice.”  The Commission provided a
“reasoned explanation” for its different treatment of cable modem service and
DSL service.
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6-3.  Opinion of Court by Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Breyer.  Concurring opinions by Stevens and by Breyer.
Dissenting opinion by Scalia, joined in part by Souter and Ginsburg.
Norfolk Southern Ry. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd.   125 S. Ct. 385, 73 USLW 4005   
(11-9-04)
Maritime law, “through” bill of lading, liability limit: Federal maritime law
governs liability for container goods shipped by sea from Australia to the United
States, and damaged in a train wreck while being transported from the port of
Savannah, Georgia, to their final destination in Huntsville, Alabama.  The
“through” bill of lading by which the Australian manufacturer Kirby contracted
with an intermediary company to arrange for transportation to Huntsville
contained a liability limitation as well as a “Himalaya Clause” extending the
liability limitation to downstream parties.  The intermediary company hired a
German shipping company to transport the goods to the United States, and
included the same liability limitation, made applicable to inland carriers.  The
shipping company in turn hired the petitioner railroad to transport the containers
on the final leg from Savannah to Huntsville.  The railroad is entitled to the
protection of the liability limitations in both bills of lading (that between the
manufacturer and the intermediary, and that between the intermediary and the
shipper).  The contracts are maritime contracts because their primary purpose
is to transport goods by sea from Australia to the United States.  The fact that
the final leg of transportation was to be over land does not alter the “essentially
maritime nature of the contracts.”  The maritime contracts are not “inherently
local,” and should be governed by uniform federal law.  Protecting the
uniformity of federal maritime law reinforces the liability regime that Congress
established in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.  Ordinary principles of contract
law govern the issue of whether the railroad can take advantage of the liability
limitations, and it is clear from the general language of the Himalaya Clause that
the railroad was an intended beneficiary of the intermediary’s contract with the
manufacturer even though the railroad was not in “privity” with the
intermediary when that bill was issued.  The intermediary’s contract with the
shipper presents a “more difficult” question, but the issue is resolved by a
default rule that a cargo owner’s recovery against a carrier is limited by the
liability limitations that the intermediary negotiates with downstream carriers.
While the intermediary is not the cargo owner’s agent for all purposes, it is for
the purpose of limiting liability.  This limited agency rule “tracks industry
practices,” and produces an “equitable result.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by O’Connor.
Orff v. United States   125 S. Ct. 2606, 73 USLW 4588   (6-23-05)
Sovereign Immunity, waiver:  The limited waiver of sovereign immunity in
the Reclamation Reform Act does not extend to a suit against the United States
brought by third-party beneficiaries of a water supply contract between the
Bureau of Reclamation and a state water district.  The provision grants “consent
to join the United States as a necessary party defendant in any suit to adjudicate
. . . contractual rights [under a reclamation contract].”  This language “is best
interpreted to grant consent to join the United States in an action between other
parties,” and not to “permit a plaintiff to sue the United States alone.”  The
traditional concept of joinder, reflected in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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19(a), supports interpreting the language to permit joinder of the United States
rather than initiation of a suit against the United States.  This interpretation is
strengthened by the contrast with broader language contained in other statutes
that waive immunity from suits against the United States; these provisions
confer jurisdiction over “any claim,” or any “civil action or claim” against the
United States.
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Thomas.
Pace v. DiGuglielmo   125 S. Ct. 1807, 73 USLW 4304   (4-27-05)
Habeas corpus, AEDPA, tolling of limitations period:  A state habeas corpus
petition that is ultimately rejected by the state court as untimely is not “properly
filed” for purposes of the provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) that tolls the one-year limitations period for filing a
federal habeas corpus claim while a “properly filed application for State . . .
review . . . is pending.”  “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state
law, that is the end of the matter for purposes of [AEDPA].”  The Court had
previously stated that compliance with time limits is a condition to proper filing,
but had reserved the issue of whether the existence of exceptions to a timely
filing requirement can prevent a late application from being considered
improperly filed.  There are “no grounds” for so holding.  “[A] petition filed
after a time limit, and which does not fit within any exception to that limit, is
no more ‘properly filed’ than a petition filed after a time limit that permits no
exception.”  “Time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions.”
“Fairness” does not require a different interpretation; petitioners required by
AEDPA to exhaust state remedies can file a protective petition in federal court
and ask the federal court to “stay and abey” its proceedings until state remedies
are exhausted.  The petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling for the time
during which his state petition was pending because he did not establish the
requisite diligence.  The petitioner waited for years before raising his state claim
of ineffective counsel, and waited five months after the state proceedings
became final before filing in federal court.
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Rehnquist, joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.  Dissenting opinion by Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Pasquantino v. United States   125 S. Ct. 1766, 73 USLW 4287   (4-26-05)
Statutory interpretation, wire fraud: A plot to defraud a foreign government
of tax revenue violates the wire fraud statute, which prohibits the use of
interstate wires to effect “any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. . . .”  In this case
the petitioners while in New York ordered liquor by phone from Maryland
stores, and then smuggled the liquor into Canada without paying Canada’s
excise taxes.  This conduct “falls within the literal terms of the wire fraud
statute.”  By representing to Canadian officials that their drivers had no goods
to declare, the petitioners engaged in “a scheme or artifice to defraud,” and the
object of their fraud was money or property in the victim’s hands.  Canada’s
right to uncollected excise taxes on the liquor smuggled into the country is
“property.”  This latter interpretation is consistent with the common law of
fraud, which covered schemes to deprive a victim of his money.  The fact that
the victim “happens to be the Government” is irrelevant.  A case holding that
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fraud in obtaining a video poker license did not deprive the Government of
property is distinguished; there the Government’s interest was “purely
regulatory” rather than economic.  Application of the wire fraud statute to the
conduct at issue does not derogate from the common law “revenue rule,” which
generally bars courts from enforcing the tax laws of foreign countries.  The
prosecution is one to punish domestic criminal conduct, not to collect taxes
owed to Canada.  In 1952 when Congress enacted the wire fraud statute there
was no common law precedent barring such enforcement of domestic criminal
law.  Restitution to Canada of its lost tax revenue, required by the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, is not designed to collect a foreign tax, but
instead “to mete out appropriate criminal punishment.”  Because the wire fraud
statute is being used to punish domestic conduct, the presumption against
extraterritorial effect presumption against inapplicable of statutes is
inapplicable.  Petitioners “used U.S. interstate wires” to further their scheme to
defraud, and their offense was complete the moment they did so.
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, and
Kennedy.  Dissenting opinion by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, and joined in part
by Scalia and Souter.
Rhines v. Weber   125 S. Ct. 1528, 73 USLW 4263   (3-30-05)
Habeas corpus, stay and abeyance: When a habeas corpus petitioner presents
a federal district court with a “mixed” petition that contains some claims that
have been exhausted in state courts and some that have not been exhausted, the
district court may  stay the petition and hold it in abeyance while the petitioner
presents his unexhausted claims to the state court.  This “stay-and-abeyance”
procedure allows the petitioner to return to federal court without having his
federal claims barred by the one-year statute of limitations imposed in 1996 by
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).  The limitations
period is tolled while a properly filed application is pending in state court.  Two
principle purposes of AEDPA reflected in the one-year limitations period and
the tolling requirement were to reduce delays in capital cases and to encourage
petitioners to seek relief from state courts before coming to federal court.
Because frequent use of stay and abeyance “has the potential to undermine these
twin policies,” the discretion of district courts in issuing such stays is
circumscribed.  Stay and abeyance may be used only “when the district court
determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his
claims first in state court,” and may not be used when the unexhausted claims
are “plainly meritless.”  Also, because “capital petitioners might deliberately
engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution,”
district courts “should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state
court and back.”
9-0.  Opinion of Court by O’Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Concurring opinions by Stevens,
joined by Ginsburg and Breyer; and by Souter, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer.
Rompilla v. Beard   125 S. Ct. 2456, 73 USLW 4522   (6-20-05)
Counsel, adequacy of representation in capital sentencing:  Even when a
capital defendant’s family members and the defendant himself have suggested
that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyers are bound to make
reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that they know the prosecution
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will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.
In this case counsels’ failure to examine the court file on the defendant’s prior
rape and assault conviction fell below the level of reasonable performance
required by the Sixth Amendment in Strickland v. Washington (1984).  Counsel
knew that the prosecution intended to argue for the death penalty by relying, in
part, on the aggravating factor that the defendant had a history of prior felony
convictions indicating the use or threat of violence, and that the prosecution
would introduce a transcript of the defendant’s prior rape and assault trial in
order to establish his violent character.  Under those circumstances, defense
counsel “had a duty to make all reasonable efforts to learn what they could
about the offense.”  The duty was “particularly pressing” in this case due to the
similarity of the violent prior offense to the crime charged, and in view of the
defense strategy of stressing residual doubt.  The requirement that defense
counsel obtain information that the prosecution has and will use against the
defendant is a basic principle embodied in the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice.  The Pennsylvania courts’ conclusion that the defense counsels’ efforts
to find mitigating evidence by other means excused them from looking at the
file from the earlier trial was an “objectively unreasonable conclusion” within
the meaning of the habeas corpus statute.  Moreover, the petitioner has shown
“beyond any doubt that counsel’s lapse was prejudicial.”  It is “uncontested”
that the file would have opened up “a range of mitigation leads” that no other
source revealed, relating to the defendant’s childhood, mental health, and
alcohol dependence.
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Souter, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinion by O’Connor.  Dissenting opinion by Kennedy,
joined by Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas.
Roper v. Simmons   125 S.  Ct.  1183, 73 USLW 4153   (3-1-05)
Death penalty for juveniles: The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment prevents imposition of the death penalty on
persons who were under age 18 at the time they committed their offense.
Missouri’s law setting the minimum age at 16 for persons eligible for the death
penalty is therefore unconstitutional as applied to persons who were under 18
at the time they committed their offense. A national consensus against execution
of juveniles has developed since the Court held in 1989, in Stanford v.
Kentucky, that execution of juveniles over age 15 was not cruel and unusual
punishment.  Stanford is “no longer controlling.”  The situation is now similar
to that found by the Court in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) to merit the conclusion
that there was a “consensus” against execution of the mentally retarded.  Thirty
states prohibit execution of juveniles: 12 that prohibit the death penalty
altogether, and 18 that exclude juveniles from its reach.  Only three states have
executed juveniles in the last 10 years.  Since Stanford, five states have
eliminated authority for executing juveniles, and no states that formerly
prohibited it have reinstated the authority.  These “objective indicia of
consensus” “provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles
. . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”  The Court’s own
judgment is also “brought to bear.”  The Eighth Amendment limits imposition
of the death penalty “to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the
most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most
deserving of execution.’”  Three general differences between juveniles and
CRS-36
adults render juveniles less culpable.  Because juveniles lack maturity and have
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility, they often engage in “impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions.”  Juveniles are also more susceptible than
adults to “negative influences” and peer pressure.  Finally, the character of
juveniles is not as well formed, and their personality traits are “more transitory,
less fixed.”  For these reasons, irresponsible conduct by juveniles “is not as
morally reprehensible,” they have “a greater claim than adults to be forgiven,”
and “a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.”  Because of the diminished culpability of juveniles, the penological
objectives of retribution and deterrence do not provide adequate justification for
imposition of the death penalty.  A categorical rule is necessary rather than
individualized assessment of each offender’s maturity; “[t]he differences
between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability.”  Although “not controlling,” “the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty” lends “confirmation”
to the Court’s conclusion.
5-4.  Opinion of Court by Kennedy, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Stevens, joined by Ginsburg.  Dissenting
opinions by O’Connor; and by Scalia, joined by Rehnquist and Thomas.
Rousey v. Jacoway   125 S. Ct. 1561, 73 USLW 4277 (4-4-05)
Bankruptcy, IRAs as exempt assets: Debtors may exempt assets in their
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E).  That provision authorizes the debtor in some
circumstances to exempt from the bankruptcy estate the right to receive payment
“under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or
contract on account of . . . age.”  The provision’s two requirements at issue are
met: petitioners’ IRAs give them the right to receive payment “on account of
age,” and the IRAs are “similar” to the listed plans.  The ordinary meaning of
“on account of” is “because of,” and there is no reason to believe that Congress
intended to depart from that ordinary meaning.  Although the IRAs provide a
right to payment on demand, a 10% penalty applies if that right is exercised
before the account holder has reached age 59½.  This penalty “substantially
deters early withdrawals” and “effectively prevents access” to the entire account
balance.  Because this restraint is removed when the account holder reaches age
59½, the right to receive payment is “on account of age.”  IRA accounts are
“similar” to stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, and annuity plans.  “The
common feature of all of these plans is that they provide income that substitutes
for wages earned as salary or hourly compensation.”  The income that the
petitioners will receive from their IRAs “is likewise income that substitutes for
wages.”  A variety of incentives, e.g., deferred taxation and penalties for early
withdrawal, are designed to make IRAs “income substitutes for wages lost upon
retirement,” and “distinguish IRAs from typical savings accounts.”  The narrow
exceptions to the early withdrawal penalty do not make IRAs more like savings
accounts; “early withdrawal without penalty remains the exception, rather than
the rule.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Thomas.
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San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco   125 S. Ct. 2491, 73 USLW
4507   (6-20-05)
Taking of property, full faith and credit statute:  Federal courts should not
carve out an exception to the full faith and credit statute for claims brought
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738, which requires federal as well as state courts to give full faith and credit
to the decisions of state courts, encompasses the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.  England v. Louisiana Board of Medical Examiners (1964),
authorizing federal courts to reserve decision of federal constitutional issues
while state courts resolve antecedent issues of state law, does not mean that
federal courts can reserve judgment on the very issues to be litigated in state
courts.  Federal court abstention under England operates when the antecedent
state issue is distinct from the reserved federal issue and resolution of the state
issue may moot the federal issue, but has no application when the state and
federal issues are identical.  Here the issues are identical.  There is no exception
from ordinary preclusion rules when a takings claim is forced into state court by
application of the ripeness rule of Williamson County (1985).  The request for
an exception is premised on the belief that plaintiffs have a right to vindicate
their federal claims in a federal forum, but the Court has repeatedly held that
there is no such right.  If federal issues have been litigated in state court, there
is no general right to have them relitigated in federal court.  Also rejected is the
assumption “that courts may simply create exceptions to [the full faith and
credit statute] whenever courts deem them appropriate.”  Exceptions can be
justified “only if plainly stated by Congress,” and Congress has not expressed
any intent to exempt takings claims from operation of the statute.  Litigation of
takings claims in state courts is common, and “state courts are fully competent
to adjudicate constitutional challenges to local land-use decisions.”
9-0.  Opinion of Court by Stevens, joined by Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Rehnquist, joined by O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas.
Shepard v. United States   125 S. Ct. 1254, 73 USLW 4186   (3-7-05)
Armed Career Criminal Act, prior burglary convictions:  In determining
whether a prior guilty plea under a state burglary statute that defines burglary
broadly constituted a conviction for burglary within the narrower “generic”
definition of burglary used for purposes of sentence enhancement under the
federal Armed Career Criminal Act, a court should not look to a police report
submitted to the state trial court.  Rather, the court should look to more
conclusive records relied upon in adjudicating guilt.  In pleaded cases such
records may be found in “the statement of factual basis for the charge . . . shown
by a transcript of the plea colloquy or by written plea agreement presented to the
court, or by a record of comparable findings of fact adopted by the defendant
upon entering the plea.”  These formal records are the closest analogs to the
indicia held permissible in Taylor v. United States (1990) for assessing
convictions that resulted from jury verdicts: statutory elements, charging
documents, and jury instructions.  The Government’s position “amounts to a
call to ease away from the Taylor conclusion, that respect for congressional
intent and avoidance of collateral trials require that evidence of generic
conviction [for burglary as defined for federal purposes] be confined to records
of the convicting court approaching the certainty of the record of conviction in
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a generic crime State.”  There is not “sufficient justification” for upsetting
precedent; “considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of
statutory interpretation, for . . . Congress remains free to alter what we have
done.”  Nearly 15 years have passed since Taylor, and Congress has not
modified the statute.
5-3.  Opinion of Court by Souter, joined by Stevens, Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Thomas.  Separate part of Souter opinion joined by Stevens, Scalia, and
Ginsburg.  Opinion by Thomas concurring in part.  Dissenting opinion by
O’Connor, joined by Kennedy and Breyer.  Rehnquist did not participate.
Small v. United States   125 S. Ct. 1752, 73 USLW 4298   (4-26-05)
Statutory interpretation, firearm possession by felon: The prohibition on
possession of a firearm by anyone who has been “convicted in any court” of a
crime punishable by a prison term exceeding one year does not apply to persons
who have been convicted in a foreign court.  “The word ‘any’ considered alone
cannot answer [the] question” of whether the prohibition covers foreign
convictions; “any” means different things in different contexts.  Although the
presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes “does not apply
directly in this case,” Congress nonetheless “generally legislates with domestic
concerns in mind.”  This “assumption” about the domestic reach of
“domestically oriented statutes” can be overcome by contrary “statutory
language, context, history, or purpose,” but here there is no such “convincing”
contrary indication.  If the provision were interpreted to apply to foreign
convictions, other provisions would create “anomalies.”  For example, an
exception that allows gun possession despite a prior conviction under “Federal
or State” antitrust laws would mean that persons with foreign antitrust
convictions would be banned from possessing guns while persons with domestic
convictions would not.  Other provisions extend the prohibition to persons
convicted of certain misdemeanor offenses also described by reference to
federal and state law; the “anomaly” here is that the prohibition would apply to
persons with such domestic convictions but not to persons with similar foreign
convictions.  The statute’s “lengthy legislative history confirms the fact that
Congress did not consider” whether foreign convictions should serve as
predicates.  References to federal and state crimes were removed during bill
consideration, but without any mention of foreign convictions.  While the
statute’s purpose of keeping guns out of the hands of dangerous people would
be served by including persons convicted in foreign courts, the force of this
argument is “weakened significantly” by the fact that “there have probably been
no more than 10 to a dozen” prosecutions that relied on a foreign conviction as
a predicate.  Given the statute’s total silence and “no reason to believe that
Congress considered the added enforcement advantages flowing from inclusion
of foreign crimes,” the assumption against “extraterritorial coverage” stands.
5-3.  Opinion of Court by Breyer, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and
Ginsburg.  Dissenting opinion by Thomas, joined by Scalia and Kennedy.
Rehnquist did not participate.
Smith v. City of Jackson   125 S. Ct. 1536, 73 USLW 4251   (3-30-05)
ADEA, disparate impact:  The disparate impact theory of recovery that has
been held available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act also applies to
actions brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
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The prohibition in the ADEA uses identical language to that of Title VII, except
for the substitution of the word “age” for the words “race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.”  Two textual differences between the ADEA and Title VII,
however, “make it clear that . . . the scope of disparate-impact liability under the
ADEA is narrower than under Title VII.”  One difference is that the ADEA
allows employers to take an otherwise prohibited action “where the
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age discrimination.”
The second is that 1991 amendments to Title VII, designed to modify the
Supreme Court’s Wards Cove decision narrowly construing disparate-impact
liability, have no application to the ADEA.  The “reasonable factors other than
age” qualification reflects the fact that “age, unlike race or other classifications
protected by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s
capacity to engage in certain types of employment.”  The petitioners in this case,
police officers who challenged a pay plan giving officers with less than five
years of tenure a higher percentage raise than those with more seniority, failed
to satisfy the Wards Cove requirement that they identify the specific
employment practices allegedly responsible for the observed statistical
disparities.  It is also “clear from the record that the City’s plan was based on
reasonable factors other than age.”  The city based raises on seniority and
position, and attempted to make salaries competitive with those of comparable
communities in the Southeast.
8-0 (judgment); 5-3 (disparate impact).  Opinion of Court by Stevens, joined by
Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Separate part of Stevens opinion joined by
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Scalia.  Opinion by
O’Connor, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, concurring only in the judgment.
Rehnquist did not participate.
Smith v. Massachusetts   125 S. Ct. 1129, 73 USLW 4125   (2-22-05)
Double jeopardy, midtrial acquittal: The trial judge’s granting of a motion
requesting a finding of not guilty on one of three counts constituted an acquittal
for purposes of double jeopardy, and the judge’s later submission of that count
to the jury was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The court’s finding,
which occurred after the prosecution rested its case, constituted an acquittal
despite the fact that Massachusetts characterizes the finding as a purely legal
matter, and despite the fact that the jury had no role.  The finding was final, and
could not be reconsidered later in the trial.  As a general matter, a state may
prescribe that a judge’s midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s proof may be reconsidered.  Massachusetts has done so, however,
only with respect to clerical and other minor errors, and has not adopted any rule
of non-finality applicable to acquittals on the merits.  Also, “the possibility of
prejudice arises” when, as in this case, the acquittal precedes the defendant’s
presentation of his case.  Interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause “cannot
be allowed to become a potential snare for those who reasonably rely upon it.”
The fact that the judge’s acquittal ruling was based on an erroneous
interpretation of precedent does not defeat application of double jeopardy; “the
bar will attach to a pre-verdict acquittal that is patently wrong in law.”  Courts
can protect themselves from such mistakes by deferring consideration of a
motion until after the verdict, and prosecutors can protect themselves by asking
for a continuance or for reconsideration before the trial is allowed to proceed.
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5-4.  Opinion of Court by Scalia, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and
Thomas.  Dissenting opinion by Ginsburg, joined by Rehnquist, Kennedy, and
Breyer.
Smith v. Texas   125 S. Ct. 400, 73 USLW 3294   (11-15-04)
Death penalty, mitigating evidence: Texas courts erred in requiring that the
defendant establish a nexus between his crime and mitigating evidence relating
to his troubled childhood and his limited mental capacity.  The Court rejected
this threshold test in Tennard v. Dretke (2004), ruling that the jury must be
allowed to consider evidence of low intelligence as mitigating evidence whether
or not a nexus to the crime is established.  The constitutional infirmity was not
cured in this case by an oral “nullification instruction” allowing the jury to give
effect to the mitigating evidence by negating what would otherwise be
affirmative responses to two special issues on a verdict form that dealt with
deliberateness and future dangerousness, and that made no mention of
mitigation.  The mandatory language in the oral nullification instruction, telling
jurors to return a false answer to a mandatory written instruction in order to
defeat a death sentence, “could possibly have intensified the dilemma faced by
ethical jurors.”
9-0.  Per curiam.
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.   125 S. Ct. 2169, 73 USLW 4429   (6-6-05)
ADA, foreign flag cruise ships: Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 (ADA), which prohibits discrimination against the disabled in the
enjoyment of public accommodations and public transportation services,
applies to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States waters.  Although the
definitions of public accommodations and public transportation services do not
expressly mention cruise ships, “there can be no serious doubt” that cruise ships
“fall within both definitions under conventional principles of interpretation.”
There is no broad clear-statement rule requiring a clear expression of
congressional intent before a federal statute may be applied to any facet of the
business and operations of foreign-flag ships.  A clear statement of intent is
required, however, before statutes may be applied in a manner that interferes
with at least some aspects of a cruise ship’s “internal order.”  Application of
federal law to foreign-flag cruise ships is barred if compliance would interfere
with international legal obligations.  By its terms, Title III requires barrier
removal that is “readily achievable,” defined as “easily accomplishable and able
to be carried out without much difficulty or expense.”  A barrier removal
requirement that would bring a vessel into noncompliance with the Safety of
Life at Sea Convention or some other international legal obligation would not
be “readily achievable.”  Similarly, structural modifications are not “readily
achievable” if they “would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others.”
6-3 (Title III can apply to foreign-flag cruise ships).  Opinion of Court by
Kennedy, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Separate parts of
Kennedy opinion joined by Stevens and Souter, and by Stevens, Souter, and
Thomas.  Concurring opinion by Ginsburg, joined by Breyer.  Concurring and
dissenting opinion by Thomas.  Dissenting opinion by Scalia, joined by
Rehnquist and O’Connor, and joined in part by Thomas.
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Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co.   125 S.  Ct.  1118, 73 USLW 4130   (2-22-05)
Maritime law, dredge as “vessel”: The Super Scoop, a dredge used to dig a
tunnel in Boston Harbor, is a “vessel” for purposes of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).  The term “vessel” is not defined in the
LHWCA, so the general definition from the Rules of Construction Act, 1 U.S.C.
§ 3, governs.  That provision, derived from the Revised Statutes and reflective
of general maritime law, defines a “vessel” as “every description of watercraft
. . . used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”
Cases long ago established that dredges as commonly used are “vessels.”
Although dredges are typically transported from job to job by towing, while
being used for dredging they are moved for short distances by a system of
anchors, windlass, and rope, and in the process they transport machinery,
equipment, and crew over water.  The respondent misreads cases holding a
floating drydock and a wharfboat not to be vessels.  The drydock had been
moored in one place for 20 years, and the wharfboat was secured to land by
cables, and also had water, electricity, and phone lines connected.  The
distinction is between watercraft “temporarily stationed” in a particular location
and those “permanently affixed” to shore or ocean floor.  The appeals court
erred in relying on a case that turned on the “primary purpose” of a watercraft.
Section 3 does not require that a watercraft be used primarily for water
transportation, and neither is the test a “snapshot” to determine whether the
vessel was actually being used for transportation at the time of the event giving
rise to the claim.  Rather, the only test is whether the craft is capable of being
used for transportation, and whether that capability is a “practical,” not merely
“theoretical,” possibility. 
8-0.  Opinion of Court by Thomas, joined by all Justices except Rehnquist, who
did not participate.
Tenet v. Doe   125 S. Ct. 1230, 73 USLW 4182   (3-2-05)
Judicial review, enforcement of espionage agreement: The respondents’ suit
against the Director of Central Intelligence, asserting estoppel and due process
claims for the CIA’s alleged failure to honor an agreement to provide financial
assistance in return for espionage services, is barred under the doctrine of Totten
v. United States (1876).  In Totten, the Court held that public policy barred a suit
by a Civil War spy to enforce obligations arising from his agreement with the
Government.  The service stipulated by the espionage contract was a secret
service, and the Totten Court found it “entirely incompatible with the nature of
such a contract that a former spy could bring suit to enforce it.”  Totten was not
a narrow contract rule inapplicable to claims based on estoppel or due process.
Rather, the Totten Court declared that “public policy forbids the maintenance
of any suit . . . , the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of
matters which the law itself regards as confidential.”  United States v. Reynolds
(1953), involving the state secrets privilege in the context of a wrongful-death
action, did not represent a retreat from Totten’s broader holding that lawsuits
premised on alleged espionage agreements are altogether forbidden.  Cases
brought by covert CIA employees are also distinguished as not implicating
“Totten’s core concern [of] preventing the [spy’s] relationship with the
Government from being revealed.”  The Court “adhere[s] to Totten.”  “The state
secrets privilege and the more frequent use of in camera judicial proceedings
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simply cannot provide the absolute protection we found necessary in
enunciating the Totten rule.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Rehnquist.  Concurring opinions by
Stevens, joined by Ginsburg; and by Scalia.
Tory v. Cochran   125 S. Ct. 2108, 73 USLW 4404   (5-31-05)
Mootness; First Amendment, prior restraint:  The petitioner’s challenge to
an injunction restraining him from picketing the respondent attorney, and from
uttering public statements about the respondent or his law practice, is not moot
even though the respondent has died.  The injunction is permanent, and, under
California law, it is not clear that the injunction can become legally void before
a court so rules.  “Given the uncertainty of California law, [the Court] take[s]
it as a given that the injunction . . . continues significantly to restrain petitioners’
speech, presenting an ongoing federal controversy.”  The respondent’s death,
however, “makes it unnecessary, indeed unwarranted,” to explore petitioners’
First Amendment claims.  The injunction has “lost its underlying rationale” of
restraining defamatory activity designed to coerce payment of money,  and “now
amounts to an overly broad prior restraint upon speech, lacking plausible
justification.”
7-2.  Opinion of Court by Breyer, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg.  Dissenting opinion by Thomas, joined by
Scalia.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales   125 S. Ct. 2796, 73 USLW 4611 (6-27-05)
Due Process, enforcement of domestic violence restraining order:  A person
who has obtained a state-law domestic violence restraining order does not have
a constitutionally protected property interest in having the police enforce the
restraining order when they have probable cause to believe it has been broken.
The respondent’s suit alleging a due process violation by the town must
therefore be dismissed.  Deference to the 10th Circuit’s determination that
Colorado law has created a property interest is “inappropriate.”  Colorado law,
providing that a peace officer “shall use every reasonable means to enforce a
restraining order,” and “shall arrest . . . or seek a warrant for the arrest of a
restrained person” when the officer has probable cause to believe a violation has
occurred, has not “truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.”
A “true mandate of police action would require some stronger indication,” given
that “a well established tradition of police discretion has long coexisted with
apparently mandatory arrest statutes.”  Even in the domestic violence context,
it is “unclear” how a mandatory-arrest requirement would apply in cases such
as this, when the offender is not present to be arrested.  Moreover, the statute
does not confer an “entitlement” to enforcement on persons protected by a
restraining order.  Although the statute confers a right to initiate civil contempt
proceedings, it merely confers a right to “request” initiation of criminal
contempt proceedings, and is silent about any power to request or demand an
arrest.  And even if there were an entitlement, “it is by no means clear that
[such] an entitlement . . . could constitute a ‘property’ interest for purposes of
the Due Process Clause.”  The Court has held that there is no property interest
in indirect benefits, i.e., in “government action that is directed against a third
party and affects the citizen only indirectly or incidentally.”
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7-2.  Opinion of Court by Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Thomas, and Breyer.  Concurring opinion by Souter, joined by Breyer.
Dissenting opinion by Stevens, joined by Ginsburg.
United States v. Booker   125 S. Ct. 738, 73 USLW 4056   (1-12-05)
Sentencing Reform Act, Sentencing Guidelines, right to jury trial: The
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in criminal cases limits the sentences that
courts may impose pursuant to the federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Under
principles applied in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), Ring v. Arizona (2002),
and Blakely v. Washington (2004), “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction)
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by
the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”  The Guidelines
direct a judge in some instances to enhance sentences in a manner that violates
this principle; a judge who makes certain factual findings supported by a
preponderance of the evidence must enhance the sentence beyond the range
otherwise authorized by the jury’s verdict or the defendant’s admissions.  The
fact that the Guidelines were developed by the Sentencing Commission rather
than by Congress “lacks constitutional significance.”  Application of Blakely to
the Guidelines is not precluded by recent cases dealing with other issues.  A
separation of powers argument is precluded by the Court’s decision in Mistretta
v. United States (1989).  The remedy for this constitutional defect that can arise
in application of the Guidelines is to hold unconstitutional two provisions of the
Sentencing Reform Act: one that makes the Guidelines mandatory, and one that
sets forth standards of review for appeals of departures from the mandatory
Guidelines.  The remainder of the act is constitutional, can function
independently, and is consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the
act. “Without the ‘mandatory’ provision, the act still requires judges to take
account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals.”  And excision
of the appellate review provision “does not pose a critical problem for handling
of appeals.”  The alternative of “maintaining all provisions of the act and
engraft[ing] [the jury trial requirement] onto that statutory scheme” is “less
consistent with Congress’ likely intent” in enacting the act than is the excision
of the two provisions and the preservation of the remaining provisions.
5-4 (application of Sixth Amendment), 5-4 (remedy).  Opinion of Court (Sixth
Amendment) by Stevens, joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
Opinion of Court (remedy) by Breyer, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Ginsburg.  Opinion dissenting in part by Stevens, joined by Souter, and
joined in part by Scalia.  Opinions dissenting in part by Scalia, and by Thomas.
Opinion dissenting in part by Breyer, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, and
Kennedy.
Van Orden v. Perry   125 S. Ct. 2854, 73 USLW 4690   (6-27-05)
Establishment Clause, displays of Ten Commandments:  The Establishment
Clause is not violated by the presence on the grounds of the  Texas State Capitol
of a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments.  Although the text of
the Ten Commandments is undeniably religious, the context of the display
communicates not simply a religious message, but a secular message as well.
The monument is one of 17 monuments and 21 historical markers on the
Capitol grounds; it was paid for by a private, civic, and primarily secular
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organization; and it has been in place, unchallenged, for 40 years.  Under the
circumstances, it is unlikely that the monument will be understood to represent
an attempt by government to favor religion.
5-4.  No opinion of Court.  Opinion by Rehnquist announcing the judgment,
joined by Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Concurring opinions by Scalia; by
Thomas, and by Breyer.  Dissenting opinions by Stevens, joined by Ginsburg; by
O’Connor; and by Souter, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg.
Whitfield v. United States   125 S. Ct. 687, 73 USLW 4053   (1-11-05)
Conspiracy, money laundering; statutory interpretation: Conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) for conspiracy to commit money laundering does not
require proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.  Subsection (h)
provides that anyone who conspires to commit a referenced money laundering
offense shall be subject to the same penalties that apply to the offense that was
the object of the conspiracy, and makes no mention of an overt act.  In United
States v. Shabani (1994), the Court held that “nearly identical language” of the
drug conspiracy statute does not require proof of an overt act.  Shabani relied
on earlier cases establishing the general rule that courts will not read an overt
act requirement into a conspiracy statute if Congress has not included one.
Common law conspiracy did not require an overt act, and, absent contrary
indication, courts presume that Congress intends to adopt the common law
definition of statutory terms.  Moreover, the general conspiracy statute, 18
U.S.C. § 371, superseded the common law by expressly including an overt act
requirement.  Congress thus had a “formulary” when it enacted the money
laundering conspiracy provision: it could model its text on section 371 and
impose an overt act requirement, or it could dispense with an overt act
requirement by modeling its text on other laws held not to contain one.
“Congress has included an overt act requirement in at least 22 other current
conspiracy statutes, clearly demonstrating that it knows how to impose such a
requirement when it wishes to do so.”  The argument that subsection (h) does
not create a new conspiracy offense is rejected.  The statute is so plain that the
legislative history on which the argument is based need not be consulted, but
even if it is, it is unpersuasive.  “Congress is presumed to have knowledge of the
governing rule described in Shabani.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by O’Connor.
Wilkinson v. Austin   125 S. Ct. 2384, 73 USLW 4473   (6-13-05)
Due Process, procedures for assignment to “Supermax” prison: Ohio
prisoners have a due process liberty interest in not being confined to the Ohio
State Penitentiary (OSP), a “Supermax” prison that isolates the most dangerous
prisoners from the general prison population and from each other.  The test for
whether a liberty interest is implicated by a change in conditions of
confinement, set forth in Sandin v. Connor (1995), is whether an assignment
“imposes atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Sandin held that 30 days’ segregated
confinement did not meet that test.  Confinement at the OSP does.  At the OSP
almost all human contact is prohibited.  Inmates are kept in solitary cells 23
hours a day, conversation between cells is prevented, exercise is allowed for
only one hour a day in a small room, a cell light is kept on continuously, the
inmate’s status is reviewed only once annually, and placement in OSP
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disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration.  The district
court erred, however, in imposing additional procedural requirements for
assignment to OSP and in requiring more frequent review of status.  The Ohio
procedures strike “a constitutionally permissible balance” under the framework
established in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976).  The inmate’s interest in avoiding
erroneous placement in OSP, while sufficient to constitute a due process liberty
interest, must be evaluated “within the context of the prison system and its
attendant curtailment of liberties.”  Ohio’s procedures, though informal and
non-adversarial, protect against erroneous placement by providing the inmate
with notice of the factual basis for assignment and a fair opportunity for
rebuttal, and by providing multiple levels of review that can reverse OSP
assignment but cannot overturn a decision against OSP placement.  The state’s
interest in prison security is “a dominant consideration.”
9-0.  Opinion for unanimous Court by Kennedy.
Wilkinson v. Dotson   125 S.  Ct.  1242, 73 USLW 4204   (3-7-05)
Section 1983 actions, relation to habeas actions:  State prisoners may sue
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of state parole
procedures, and are not limited to seeking relief under the federal habeas corpus
statutes.  The general rule, set forth in Preiser v. Rodriguez (1973), is that
section 1983 may not be used for actions that lie “within the core of habeas
corpus,” defined as actions challenging the fact or duration of confinement.
This bar applies whether actions seek to invalidate the duration of imprisonment
directly, e.g., through an injunction compelling speedier release, or indirectly,
e.g., “through a judicial determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness
of the State’s custody.”  The challenges in these two consolidated cases are to
parole-eligibility proceedings and parole-suitability proceedings, and success
will not necessarily result in immediate release from prison or in a shortening
of the term of confinement.  In the one case, success “means at most new
[parole] eligibility review,” and in the other case “means at most a new parole
hearing at which [state] authorities may, in their discretion, decline to shorten
[the prisoner’s] term.”
8-1.  Opinion of Court by Breyer, joined by Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor,
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.  Concurring opinion by Scalia, joined by
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